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SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS
ON PERPETUITIES REFORM
THOMAs L. WATERBURY*

Ten years ago, the Pennsylvania legislature inaugurated a new
era of interest in improving the common law rule against perpetuities.' Since that time, the merits and demerits of the Pennsylvania
"wait-and-see" doctrine have been widely discussed in periodicals,2
two general treatises,3 a treatise on the rule by Messrs. J. H. C.
Morris of Oxford University and W. Barton Leach of Harvard
Law School' and a series of published lectures by Professor Lewis
M. Simes of Michigan.5 Contemporaneously, some judicial support
has appeared in New Hampshire6 and Massachusetts, 7 and substantial legislative approval has been registered in Massachusetts,"
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon 1950).
2. Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 1411 (1957) ; Bordwell, Perpetuitiesfrom the Point of View of the
Draughtsiman, 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 429 (1956) ; Simes, The Policy Against
Perpetuities, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707 (1955) ; Leach, An Act Modifying and
Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities, 39 Mass L.Q. 15 (Oct. 1954);
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349
(1954); Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic, 34 B. U. L. Rev. 129 (1954) ; Looker,
Leach, Simes and Newhall, Reform of Rule Against Perpetuities, 92 Trusts
& Estates 768 (1953) ; Newhall, Doctrine of the"Second Look," 92 Trusts &
Estates 13 (1953) ; Simes, Is the Ride Against PerpetuitiesDoomed? The
'Wait-and-See' Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953) ; Leach, Perpetuitiesin
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721
(1952); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68
Statute
on PerA Defense
of Pennsylvania's
(1952)L.Q.
; Br~gy,
L.Q. Rev.2335Temp.
Experiment
The Pennsylvania
; Phipps,
313 (1950)
pctuitics,
Statute,
263
L. Rev.
97 U. Pa.
20 (1949);
in Perpetuities, 23 Temp. L.Q.
Recent
511 (1948);
Rev.Note,
(1948); Recent Statute, 23 N.Y.U.EL.Q.
60 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1947).
3. Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1230 (2d ed. 1956);
6 American Law of Property § 24.11 (Leach and Tudor eds. 1952).
4. Morris and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities 32-35 (1956).
5. Sines, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 72-73 (1955).
6. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, A.2d 207 (1953). The
case offers, as an alternative ground of decision, the orthodox point that the
testator had in fact split a contingency and the valid event had occurred. See
Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait-and-See' Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 182 (1953). Moreover, New Hampshire has previously taken unorthodox perpetuities positions. See Edgerly v. Barker, 66
N.H. 434, 31 At. 900 (1891) (involving judicial reduction of an age contingency in excess of twenty-one).
7. Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952). This case
can be rationalized on the orthodox ground (stated in the opinion, but not
relied on) that the testator did not intend to include afterborns. See Simes, Is
the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait-and-See' Doctrine, 52
Mich. L. Rev. 179, 181-82 (1953). There is also an earlier Florida decision
which lends support to "wait-and-see." Story v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
8. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184A, §§ 1-6 (1955).
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Maine," and Connecticut. 0 During 1956, the Lord Chancellor's
Law Reform Committee published a report, recommending an
English version of wait-and-see. 11 Most recently the Vermont
legislature has enacted legislation combining wait-and-see with a
cy pres doctrine.12
Thus, in a decade, a prima facie case has emerged for widespread adoption of the Pennsylvania experiment. But during this
period, as it happens, both Professor Leach, the most conspicuous
wait-and-see proponent, and Professor Simes, the most conspicuous
dissenter, have been cast in the role of advocates. And, since controversy has centered on the wait-and-see principle itself, less attention has been focused on its possible corollaries in the area of
perpetuities reform. Perhaps, then, there is something to be gained
by a general reappraisal, with some attention to the latter. This
article is offered with that thought.

I. THE WAIT-AND-SEE DOCTRINE
A.

GENESIS

An appropriate starting point is the Pennsylvania legislation
itself. The Estates Act of 1947 seeks to improve upon the common
law rule in two respects. First, via wait-and-see, to avoid the invalidation of contingent interests which ultimately vest within the
permitted period of lives in being and twenty-one years, but are
not, at their creation, certain to do so.13 Secondly, via a change in
the disposition of invalid interests, to avoid tracing the beneficiaries
of invalidity through lines of descent from the testator.14 The
former of these "amendments" of the common law rule is stated
as follows :1
Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law
rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events any interest not then vested and any interest in members of a class the membership of which is then subject to
increase shall be void.
A technical weakness of this statute, as critics were quick to point
9. Me. Rev. Stat Ann. c. 160, §§ 27-33 (Supp. 1955).
10. Conn. Gen. Stat §§ 2912d-2916d (Supp. 1955).

11. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 10, 13
(1956).
12. See note 23 infra.

13. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.4 (Purdon 1950).
14. Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 20, § 301.5 (Purdon 1950), quoted in note 123
infra. Of course, some contingent interests are created by inter vivos transfers, but the bulk of them are created by will. In this article, the creator of
the interest is referred to as the testator unless problems peculiar to inter
vivos transfers are under discussion.
15. Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 20, § 301.4(b) (Purdon 1950).
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out, is that it requires, but omits to provide, some method other
than the common law method of selecting measuring lives. 16 As a
result, the period during which actual events may be considered is
uncertain. And, as a further and correlative result, the date, which
must await the period's expiration, upon which a claimed violation
of the rule can first be asserted is unascertainable. Thus, while
the statute's broad objective-that of avoiding invalidity arising

from extremely remote possibilities-has been generally approved,
there have been few defenders of its technical adequacy. 7
The controversial aspect of the statute is that, at bottom, it is
the conceptual antithesis of the common law rule.18 The common
law conception is that a contigent interest may be valid only if, at
the date of its creation, it is absolutely certain to vest within the permitted period. The statutory conception is that a contingent interest

may be invalid only if, at the close of the permitted period, it has
not vested.' 9
More specifically, the Pennsylvania statute requires (1) a de-

layed determination of the validity of any contingent interest,20 and
16. See Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed? The 'Waitanud-See' Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 186 (1953); Comment, 48 Mich. L.
Rev. 1158, 1167-70 (1950) ; Recent Statute, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1174, 1175-76
(1947); ef. Note, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263, 267 (1948). Though Professor
Leach has never conceded more to this defect than the necessity for some
judicial construction, Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 1411, 1415 (1957). But query? True, the only unique thing
about measuring lives under the common law rule is the fact that they must
be so connected with the happening of conditions precedent to vesting, that
the conditions precedent are certain to occur, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after the lives terminate. Hence, the central problem presented to the
judiciary is clear enough: that of broadening the common law method of
selection so as to avoid nullifying the wait-and-see principle without opening the door to irrelevant lives, selected with the benefit of hindsight. But
the problem will come to the courts piecemeal which probably means that
judicial inquiry extending over a number of cases would be required to
formulate a general rule. And this method of arriving at a workable body
of doctrine will clearly involve a century or more of delay, because wait-andsee postpones the permitted date for litigation, in Pennsylvania, to the end
of the permitted period. It is true, however, that this last fact cuts both ways.
Arguendo, because delay is necessary, there is plenty of time for Pennsylvania to work out a legislative solution. The weakness of this lighthearted
approach is, of course, that subsequently enacted legislation, if it is to be
effective for the intervening period, must face difficult problems of retroactivity. For some statutory possibilities, see note 96 infra.
17. For an attempted defense see Note, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263, 267
(1948). For possible legislative approaches, see note 96 infra.
18. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 10 (1956).
19. Perhaps with this antithesis in mind, the Pennsylvania revisors declared that their statute "is intended to disturb the common law rule as little
as possible." Commission's Comment, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.4(b)
(Purdon 1950).
20. There is common law precedent for such delay, during the continuance of valid prior estates. See In re Miller, 351 Pa. 144, 40 A.2d 484
(1945) ; In re Lauck's Estate, 358 Pa. 369, 57 A.2d 855 (1948). For an exhaustive discussion of the Pennsylvania cases, see Phipps, The Pennsylvania
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(2) that the actual events of the period of delay be considered in
determining validity. These two obviously dependent ideas constitute the "wait-and-see" doctrine, and the nub of current controversy
regarding perpetuities reform is the merit of this approach as opposed to the status quo, specific statutory amendments of limited
scope, 21 the extension of the rule against perpetuities to vested interests which do not become possessory within the period of the
rule,22 the possibility of developing a cy pres doctrine to deal with
invalid interests, 23 and various combinations of the latter three.
B. ACTUAL EVENTS VERSUS POSSIBILITIES
From one standpoint, proponents of the Pennsylvania experiment have labored against heavy odds. Pennsylvania's premiere
performance was technically defective. Wait-and-see is antithetical
to a major premise of the common law rule, and previous departures
Experiment in Perpetuities, 23 Temp. L.Q. 20, 24-33 (1949). There is

Massachusetts authority to the same effect See B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777 (1950). However, this doctrine is of
scope
and has not, in fact, prevented litigation in most states.
uncertain
infra.
See pp. 71-75

21. This is one of Professor Simes' suggestions. Simes, Public Policy
and the Dead Hand 77-78 (1955). Though Messrs. Leach and Morris dis-

parage its adequacy, Leach and Morris, Book Review, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 580,

581 (1956).
22. This is tentatively suggested by Professor Simes. Simes, Public

Policy and the Dead Hand 80-82 (1955).
23. This was originally the suggestion of Judge Quarles. See Quarles,

The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against
Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 384 (1946).
More recently, it has been seconded by Professor Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 748
(1952), but disapproved by Professor Simes, The Policy Against Perpctuities, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 736 (1955). This solution is also disapproved,
on grounds of vagueness and uncertainty, by the Law Reform Committee.
Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 16-17 (1956).
However, the Vermont Legislature apparently was persuaded of its merits
this past session. Vt. Acts 1957, No. 177, § 1 provides:
"Rule against perpetuities; interest reformed to conform with intent.

Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule
against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to
approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest. In
determining whether an interest would violate said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual
rather than possible events."

The first sentence, taken alone, would seem to contemplate the application of cy pres to cure invalidity under the possibilities test of the common
law rule. This follows, prima facie, from the use of the phrase "which would
violate" which seems to contemplate a prediction of compliance. But the
second sentence makes it abundantly clear that the test in Vermont is to be waitand-see. The net effect then, seems to be that Vermont has enacted a Pennsylvania style wait-and-see statute, but has substituted cy pres reform of

interests which fail to pass the actual events test for the Pennsylvania solution of vesting invalid interests in those entitled to income at the end of the
perpetuities period. For the Pennsylvania provisions dealing with invalid
interests, see note 123 infra.
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from those premises have been singularly unsuccessful, prompting

a number of states to return to the common law rule.24 Further, in
an area where predictability is revered, the common law rule, assisted by the formidable scholarship of John Chipman Gray,25 seemed
comfortingly precise in application.

But this weakness was also an advantage. Because of the antithesis, supporters of wait-and-see could take the cherry in one bite-

the case against the common law rule was, substantially, the case
for wait-and-see. This dual case, advanced most ably by Professor
Leach and his associates, and countered by Professor Simes and

others, must now be examined in detail.
The end result of wait-and-see is to save some interests which
would violate the common law test of possibilities. Obviously, such
a change is justifiable only if the rigor of the possibilities test is not.
Prima facie, a rigorous common law rule is harder to justify if the
policy against perpetuities is of limited importance. Logically there-

fore, Professor Leach opened with an assault upon the importance
of the rule.
1. Unimportance in the Atomic Age

In the eyes of Professor Leach, present day income and transfer
taxes "have largely eliminated any threat to the public welfare from

family dynasties built either on great landed estates or on great
capital wealth, '

28

so the proper function of the rule today is merely

27
to curb "vain, capricious action by wealthy empire builders.11 But

if taxation has solved the problem, whence come the empire builders? The fact is that our income and transfer taxes do not preclude
28
the accumulation and transmission of large fortunes.
24. Professor Leach conceded all this, except the matter of antithetical
premises, which he did not mention. Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Endi9 the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 H-Iar. L. Rev. 721, 724-25 (1952).
25. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1952). In a recent
California case, the court, in indirect but impressive tribute to the force
of Gray's codification, felt obliged to point out that he had not authored
the rule. In re Sallender's Estate, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 339, 201 P.2d 69, 75
(1948). Professor Leach has also contributed to the aura of perpetuities immutability, having described the rule as "all things to all men . . . to the
troubled spirit, a blessed sheltering realization that lives-in-being-and-twentyone-years have the same validity after two world wars and four Democratic
administrations that they had when Queen Victoria ascended the throne."
Leach, Cases and Text on the Law of Wills 203 (2d ed.: rev. 1955).
26. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 727 (1952).
27. 6 American Law of Property § 24.11 at 43 (Leach and Tudor eds.

1952).

28. Some persuasive evidence of this is afforded by the Third National
Trust Income Survey recently conducted by the Trust Division of the
American Bankers Association. 35 Trust Bull. 2 (Feb. 1956). With about
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On this matter of the rules importance, wait-and-see is saved,
not by its friends, but by its enemies. It is Professor Simes who has
pointed out with convincing clarity that the rule's traditional justification as an agent for maintaining the alienability of property
30% of the Division's membership reporting, the survey showed a total of
over 21,000 private trusts producing annual income from $10,000 up. Over
7,000 of these produced incomes exceeding $25,000. True it may well be that
these figures represent more than 30% of the large trusts administered by
the Trust Division's membership, because the larger trust institutions may
well have responded to the survey questionnaire more religiously than the
smaller ones. But, on the other hand, there are doubtless a number of large
trusts in the United States which do not employ a corporate trustee at all.
Moreover, some of the trusts shown by the survey to have much smaller
incomes may have been segments of large estates which were being administered as a series of separate trusts for tax or other reasons. A little mental
capitalizing of income at the rate of 4% will convince the reader that some substantial accumulations of wealth exist in private trusts today.
On the income tax side, we have the testimony of the late Randolph Paul
before the 84th Congress' Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, which points out that the effective income
tax rate for 1951 on adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 to $150,000, allowing
10% for deductions and adding in excluded capital gains, was 43% of adjusted gross income. Indeed, according to Mr. Paul's figures, which were
based upon official Treasury Department Statistics of Income, it is necessary
to-attain an adjusted income of $1,000,000 to $1,500,000 before the effective
tax rate, thus computed, reaches 50%, and in the next highest bracket,
$1,500,000 to $2,000,000, the effective rate thus computed declines to 37%.
If it be argued that there are very few such people, the answer is that there
were, at an arithmetical minimum, over 9,600 taxpayers in the $100,000 to
$150,000 income bracket in 1951 (i.e., there would have been more than this
unless each of them had, in fakct, reported the maximum adjusted gross
income of $150,000). Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 253-55
(1956).
Further on the income tax side, we have the well-publicized list of generally available loopholes for the high-bracket income taxpayer, e.g., tax
exempt municipal bond interest, percentage depletion on mineral deposits, a
capital gains maximum rate of 25%, the income tax revaluation of property
at death under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014, etc. And we also have the
special interest loopholes, of which Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1240, the socalled "Louis B. Mayer amendment," is perhaps the most dramatic recent
example. For a discussion of § 1240, see Cary, Pressure Groups and the
Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the
Tax Law, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 745, 747-48 (1955). For a current discussion
of the special interest problem, citing much of the literature, see Surrey, The
Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1957).
On the estate and gift tax side, there is also plenty of evidence that substantial transmission of wealth is not precluded by our transfer taxes. See
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, Federal Tax Policy
for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subommitte on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 819 (1956) ; Casner, Property Disposition Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, id. at 847; Harriss,
Economic Effects of Estate and Gift Taxation,id. at 855; Bittker, Recommendations for Revision of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, id. at 864; DeWind,
The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 Calif. L.
Rev. 79 (1950). Eisenstein, op. cit. supra at 840, points out that, since enactment of the marital deduction, the effective tax rate on a taxable estate of
$1,000,000 has declined from 27.0% to 23.3%.
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must be vastly qualified for the reason that "whether in England or
America, nearly all future interests are, or may become, future interests in a trust fund, which may be invested and reinvested." 29
Thus the existence of future interests is most unlikely to withdraw
specific property from commerce and render it unproductive. True,
Professor Simes would still invest the rule with a broad purpose,
that of fostering control of wealth by the living rather than the
dead."0 But how much broader is this interest than that of the testator's successors, who would prefer to succeed to his property outright? The interest of the general populace would seem decidedly
peripheral.
Specifically, Professor Simes points out that the modem future
interest in a fund, while not rendering property unproductive, results in commitment of wealth to conservative capital investments
rather than consumption. Conceding this, it is difficult to convert
the point into a broad perpetuities rationale. After all, within the
rule, such commitment may be secured for a century, more or less,
and there is no apparent reason to suppose that distribution day will
tie in with the investment and consumption needs of our economy.
And even on distribution day, what will occur? The recipients may
purchase consumers goods, or buy uranium stock, but they also may
continue with the same sort of investments, or, insofar as the rule
is concerned, forthwith re-constitute the trust for a succeeding century.3 1 Moreover, there seem to be no reliable statistics on the total
wealth held in private trusts in the United States,82 to say nothing
29. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 720

(1955).

30. Id. at 723.
31. A choice to which our current transfer tax structure lends some

encouragement via the tax free life estate, with or without a special power

of appointment. See pages 49-50 infra.
32. So says Mr. Mills, President of the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association. Mills, Meeting the Challenge of Expanding Trust
Fields, 96 Trusts & Estates 213 (March 1957), who further states that, "The
Committee on Statistics appointed in the Trust Division is working on
methods to collect and compile industrywide statistics about personal trusts."
The accounting problems here are formidable. Many trust institutions apparently inventory both real estate and securities at market value at the date of
acquisition. Hence the resulting book values suffer from all of the infirmities
of balance sheet fixed asset valuations. Then there is the matter of appraising
real property holdings accurately for survey purposes.
The most helpful statistics known to this writer are contained in the
Third National Trust Income Survey, reported in 35 Trust Bull. 2 (Feb.
1956). This survey dealt with the income produced by inter vivos and testamentary private trusts, including insurance trusts, held by 30% (862) of the
member institutions of the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association. Apparently, this association counts virtually all corporate fiduciaries
who engage in private trust business among its members. The survey
showed 13,911 trusts producing annual incomes of $10,000 to $25,000, the
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of multi-generation private trusts. So the significance of this source
of institutional investment as compared with, for example, investments of life insurance companies, 8 is a matter of conjecture. Besides, assuming the rather unsettled case against institutional investment, as such,34 if freeing funds for consumption and long-shot
investments is the objective, we have a much sharper tool in the
federal income and transfer tax structure. To free funds for consumption, we can reduce income and transfer tax rates in the lower
brackets at the expense of higher bracket taxpayers. And to encourage long-shot investments, we can encourage speculative industrial
development with specific tax subsidies, if the present capital gains
possibilities are insufficient.3"
On balance, the rule emerges as class law for those in our society
who possess substantial means, and their families or other chosen
beneficiaries. Thus far, it has only incidental relevance to the general public. Such a conclusion does not, of course, establish the
irrelevance of the rule. There is still the matter of adjusting the
prerogatives of the testator, and his successors. But the conclusion
does invite attention to the relatively generous restraints which
Anglo-American law has placed upon freedom of testation.",
However, before conceding so much, let us turn again to the
tax question. Is Professor Simes right in saying "undue concentraaverage income being $15,418, and 7,172 trusts producing annual incomes
in excess of $25,000, the average in this instance not being included. Upon

inquiry to the Trust Division, the writer was advised that this average

figure was not available for publication. Since the burden of the statistics
published was to establish that corporate fiduciaries serve people of ordi-

nary means, rather than those of wealth, there was clear incentive to
minimize the role of the larger trusts. Hence, it may well be that this average
figure was not published because it was a good deal larger than $25,000.
33. The investments of American life companies in 1956, excluding
policy loans, totaled $88,400,000,000. Life Insurance Fact Book, page 62
(1957).
34. See Broehl, Are Institutions "Controlling" Business?, 95 Trusts &
Estates 64 (Jan. 1956), arguing that the business acumen of institutional
investors can be of value in determining questions of business policy. There
is also the familiar point that future technological advance is more likely
to be the result of the massive research program of established industry
than has been true in the past; to the extent that this is so, continued investment emphasis on this class of enterprise is justifiable. On the other hand,
there is a good deal of sentiment favoring the conclusion that there is a
shortage of true risk capital, an item which the corporate fiduciary is,
prima facie, ill qualified to supply. See Hoover, Capital Accumulation and
Progress, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 124, 134 (vol. 2 1950).
35. After all, the investor who participates in organizing and financing
a successful corporate enterprise can sell out later at capital gain rates,
though there are obvious problems in the minority interest position and in
marketing closely held corporate shares.
36. Professor Simes concludes that statutory developments have placed
some restrictions on freedom of testation in England and substantially more
restraints thereon in the United States. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead
Hand 1-20 (1955). See note 48 infra.
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tion of wealth is an evil which can best be combatted by tax legislation, rather than by perpetuity rules" ?37
Certainly it is true that the rule against perpetuities cannot insure
a reduction in the size of family fortunes. The rule can serve no
further function in this regard than to insure that, if an estate plan
guards a lineal line of fools, some fool will ultimately be empowered
to squander the family fortune. Indeed if, instead, the lineal line is
laden with financial genius, the plan might be the retarding instrument and the rule the accessory to further accumulations of wealth.
But it by no means follows that the length of the perpetuities
period has no bearing upon tax avoidance, in the United States, at
the present time. Under our federal estate tax statutes, no tax is
levied upon the termination of a life estate, unless it has been retained by the decedent. 8 And the taxation of property passing
under a special power of appointment, other than one retained by
the donor, is narrowly confined. 9 So our transfer taxes are not
ordinarily levied upon the termination of a beneficiary's interest
37. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 57 (1955).
38. The propriety of dosing this "loophole" has been discussed of late,
following a Treasury Study, calling attention to the tax avoidance possibilities of successive tax-free estates. See Surrey, An Introduction to Revisior of the FederalEstate and Gift Taxes, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 18-27 (1950) ;
Rudick, What Alternative to the Estate and Gift Taxes?, 38 Calif. L. Rev.
150, 155, 167-82 (1950). The Montana inheritance tax statutes contained a
rather puzzling provision subjecting the interest of the successor to a life
tenant
taxation upon the termination of such life estate. Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. §to91-4434
(1947). This provision was repealed by the legislature in
1955. Mont. Rev. Codes .Ann. § 91-4434 (Supp. 1957).
39. Under the federal estate tax law, this situation only arises when the
special power is exercised by creating a second power, valid under local law
for a period measured from the exercise rather than the creation of the first
power. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041(a) (3). A Delaware statute creates
this local law situation in that state, even if the second power is a special
power. Del. Cod6 Ann. tit. 25, § 501 (1953). But § 2041 (a) (3) is so worded
as to extend its application to cases in which a special power is exercised
by creating a general power exercisable by deed or will. See Casner, Property
Disposition Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, Federal Tax Policy
for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 847, 849-50 (1955). There are, however,
some state inheritance tax statutes which tax the passing of property under
a special power of appointment. See Idaho Code Ann. § 14-402(6) (1948) ;
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-1520 (1949) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950 Rev.) § 7.561 ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 291.01(3) (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 91-4404
(1947) ; N.Y. Tax Law § 220(4) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-21 (1953) ; S.C.
Code § 65-462 (1952) ; S.D. Code § 57.2104 (1939). The Wisconsin statute
excludes property subject to a narrowly defined group of special powers from
taxation. Wis. Stat. § 72.01 (5) (1955). All of these statutes were based
upon New York legislation. See Thompson, State Death Taxes and Powers
of Appointment, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 549, 563-76 (1941). See generally, Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes, 52 Yale L. J. 296, 494
(1943) ; Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 55

(1951).
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unless he possessed not only the right to enjoy the property during
his lifetime, but also relatively unrestricted control over its disposition, and, in long-term settlement, such control need only be given
to the ultimate remainderman. 40 This being so, it is clear that the
permissible duration of a series of life estates, accompanied by nontaxable powers, is most relevant to the bite of our transfer taxes and thus to the redistribution of wealth which they are able to
achieve.
The real strength of Professor Simes' position lies in the fact
that a perpetuities period which is short enough for tax purposes
is clearly too short for other purposes. 41 Whether the proper function of the transfer tax system be redistribution of wealth, 2 or the
exaction of needed revenue, 43 simple fairness points to equal tax
burdens for estates of equal size, irrespective of the chosen form of
disposition. On this tack, it is unfair that an estate which is passed
from generation to generation by outright testamentary disposition
should bear a heavier tax burden than a second, managed and conserved with equal skill, which passes in trust, each successive generation being limited to income interests. 44 But a tax-conscious rule
40. Except, of course, to the extent that it is important to qualify
a transfer to a surviving spouse for the marital deduction, Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2056, or to so qualify an inter vivos gift to a spouse, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2523.
41. Why, for example, should a testator, whose very nice wife is both
devoid of skill in business matters and fondly indulgent of sons too young
to be judged as businessmen, be denied the privilege of preserving his
estate in trust so that the wife, and the sons if necessary, may be provided for
while saving something for succeeding generations? Prima facie, this is a
reasonable arrangement on the facts and ought to be permissible. Where
is the public interest in mismanagement of this testator's estate? Conversely, why should such a testator's family be accorded transfer tax advantages because the wife is, and the sons may be, less able to manage
financial affairs than the family of another testator whose .family situation
makes outright bequests advisable? Prima facie, they ought not to be.
42. The thesis of Professor Bittker. Bittker, Recommendations for
Revision of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee oh Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 864, 865 (1955).
43. Their primary historic function, in the view of Mr. Eisenstein. Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, id. at 819, 820-31.
44. It is quite possible, of course, to argue that there are differences.
Focusing on the life tenant, his interest is much less than full ownership
(e.g., unless he has some power of appointment over corpus, he has no
power of disposition) and the balance of ownership is elsewhere (e.g., in a
vested remainderman who does have the power to dispose of corpus).
Arguendo, therefore, it is unfair to treat the life tenant as full owner for
transfer tax purposes. Moreover, suppose the remainderman predeceases the
life tenant. Do we include the value of his interest in his taxable estate?
(Apparently the English Estate Duty would apply on these facts. Finance
Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30, § 2(1) (a). The tax would be measured by the
market value of the interest. Finance Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict, c. 30, §§ 7(5),
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against perpetuities, designed to avoid this problem, would preclude
the creation of successive estates (either vested or contingent) beyond the point of provision for a surviving spouse. And such a rule
would be cruelly harsh in its application to the testator who, because
of the youth, business inexperience or financial ineptness of some
members of his family, has need of the law of successive estates in
preparing a sensible estate plan.
All this points persuasively to a transfer tax structure which
remains apart from the private law of perpetuities, and vice versa.
(If it also implies my personal preference - an end to the transfer
tax free status of successive estates - I hastily acknowledge that
this latter question, besides being technically most complex, is
wholly severable. 45 I also acknowledge that, without a doubt, the
7(6)). If so, then upon the subsequent death of the life tenant, will the full
value of the property be includible in the life tenant's estate? (This seems to
be the English solution, under their Estate Duty. Finance Act, 1894, 57 &
58 Vict., c. 30, §§ 2(1) (b), 7(7)). But the effect of this solution is to cause
the life tenant and remainderman to bear heavier transfer tax burdens than
would have resulted had an outright gift been made to the life tenant, and had
the life tenant survived the remainderman. Of course, the same can be said
of our own federal estate tax, as respects a retained life estate with remainder. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 2031, 2036..........
And then there are always the problems of avoidance by sheer technical
skill. For example, it seems that the English, although they levy estate
duty on termination of a life estate by death, do not do so upon such termination
of a contingent income interest in a discretionary trust Lord Advocate v.
Muir's Trustees 21 Ann. Tax Cas. 204 (1942), 15 Halsbury, Laws of England, Estate Duty 11 n.(e) (3d ed. 1956). See Morris and Leach, The Rule
Against Perpetuities 17 (1956).
In other words, the problem of establishing precise transfer tax equality
between outright ownership, passed from generation to generation, and a
series of successive estates may well be insuperable. For further discussion,
see Surrey, Ain Introduction to Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1950) ; Rudick, What Alternative to the Estate
and Gift Taxes?, id. at 150. So our question may well be whether it is fairer
to impose some transfer tax penalty (to be minimized as much as possible)
upon the multi-generation estate plan, as compared with a series of outright transfers, or to accord such an estate plan substantial transfer tax
preferences, as at present I would vote for the change.
45. As to technical complexity, see notes 44, 38 supra. As to severability,
the point is obvious. One need not agree that the transfer tax free status
of successive estates should be brought to an end; it is sufficient to agree that
if this change is to be made, it is unwise to achieve it by a drastic shortening
of the perpetuities period which would virtually prohibit the creation of
future estates.
To nail down the undesirability of such a course, beyond its effect of
denying the use of future interests to those who need them, we might look
at practicalities. Limiting transfer tax avoidance by restrictive changes in
the law of perpetuities presents the problem of ramming perpetuities legislation of unprecedented rigor through the legislatures of every state, with the
possible exception of Louisiana. Moreover, every victory would render
enactment in the remaining states more difficult because of the incentive
of the latter to attract migrant wealth by relatively liberal perpetuity rules.
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best way to relieve transfer tax questions from involvement with
the law of future interests is to abolish transfer taxes. 48 )
Thus, at the policy level, the case for Professor Simes' conclusion is a strong one indeed. True, the case falls short of establishing
the literal irrelevance of perpetuities to taxes. Since, at present, the
period of perpetuities is tied to the period of permissible transfer
tax avoidance, it will be prudent to consider the tax consequences
of a change to wait-and-see. But since the period of contingency
at common law, in the hands of a careful draftsman, is something
like a century, we should be surprised to find in the wait-and-see
doctrine a broad avenue to tax avoidance. The barn is well emptied,
47
under the common law rule.
In summation, it proves impossible to tie the law of perpetuities
to transfer tax policy either. It must, therefore, be conceded that
the rule is class law, the central function of which is to aid the
testator's family in prying the ancestral fortune from custodianship,
after an appropriate interval. On a broader plane, it may reflect
some community feeling that gloomy appraisals of one's progeny
can be carried too far. However, no vital public interest appears to
be at stake. Now what has been established? This much at least: In
passing on issues of perpetuities policy, we are substantially concerned with the interest of the testator and his family (or other
chosen beneficiaries). Accordingly, in passing on such issues, we
should focus attention on these parties. We need not be greatly concerned about the commonweal. Thus, the wait-and-see doctrine is
46. This point is stated with impressive force by Professor Oliver.
"The interstitial nature of federal law, generally recognized by the Supreme
Court as being based on the technical inability in specific statutory treatment
of a federal question to define the content of all the legal terms and concepts
involved, has been recognized with respect to even so comprehensive a body
of legislative and administrative codification as that represented by the I.R.C.
and the Regulations. While Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie v. Tompkins
that there was no federal common law has not stood uncontradicted by later
opinions coming from the Supreme Court, there is still, even in the tax field
(as distinguished from some others, such as the 'federal law merchant') very
little that could be called a federal common-law-of-property-for-tax-purposesonly. Yet it is precisely in the field of property law, broadly defined to include
the basic temporal-quantitative concept of estates, the various 'Rules of
Property,' and the essentials of trusts and future interests, that dis-uniform or
deviant state jurisprudence is at a minimum." Oliver, The Nature of the
Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 Calif. L.

Rev. 638, 655-56 (1954).
47. Thus, insofar as taxes are concerned, the warning of Professor
Leach, that the failure of some states to liberalize the common law rule is
likely to result in a shifting of wealth to jurisdictions which have seen the
light, seems ill-founded. See Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Endng the
Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 730 (1952).
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entitled to whatever presumption there may be in favor of freedom
48
of testation.
2. Failure to Wait-and-See
As we have observed, the case against the common law requirement of mathematical certainty of vesting is really the case for the
wait-and-see doctrine, and vice versa.4 9 Happily, therefore, the entire controversy may be neatly subsumed within two affirmative
cases, the case for wait-and-see and the case for the common law
test of posibilities. The pros include the cons.
a. The case for wait-and-see
Obviously, the net effect of determining validity on the basis of
actual events is to validate some interests which violate the common
law rule. This follows from the fact that a determination of validity
on the basis of possibilities necessarily ignores probabilities, though
the latter are, obviously, more likely to occur in fact. By the same
token, the contingent interests which are saved by looking to actual
events are likely to be those which probably would vest within lives
in being and twenty-one years, but might not.5" The first argument
for the wait-and-see doctrine is derived from these truisms.
Wait-and-see penalizes the intentional violator
Under an actual events test, violations are more likely to occur
in the case of remote interests which are created deliberately. Anyone who is interested in passing his accumulation of the world's
goods through a number of succeeding generations must, to effectuate his purpose, respect the laws of probabilities and create contingent interests which will in fact vest. Since he must plan prospectively, he will doubtless include contingencies which are both likely
and unlikely to occur, but the core of his plan must be the likely
ones. Furthermore, this sort of person is likely to consult an experienced estate planner, who can, barring a succession of untimely
48. Professor Simes concludes that, in England, no substantial restraints
on freedom of testation in favor of the family were imposed for over a century prior to the 1938 enactment of the relatively mild Family Provisions
Act, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 45 (1938). Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand
7, 10-12. He also concludes that, in the United States, more extensive restrictions (dower, statutory dower, rights of election, community rights, family
allowance and homestead) have been imposed. Id. at 12-20.
49. See p. 45 supra. This follows, of course, from the antithetical
premises of the two. See p. 43 supra.
50. This is not necessarily true, of course, in any particular case.
Sometimes, the improbable possibility turns out to be the event.

-MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:41

deaths, preserve contingencies about a century by the judicious use
of a savings clause with well-chosen measuring lives. 51
On the other hand, a truly unlikely possibility of remoteness
can creep into a much less elongated plan of disposition, and is
really more likely to creep in undetected simply because the draftsman does not have a long-term plan in mind.
It can be said in reply that matters of motive are peripheral at
best. The ultimate question is whether actual events or possibilities
is the better criterion of validity, all things considered. But one
cannot consider all things simultaneously, and it is surely of some
importance that the actual events criterion aims much more specifically at the deliberate violator than does the common law rule.
Of course, this argument assumes that the actual duration of
contingent interests is of ultimate relevance, and that possibilities
of remoteness are only relevant insofar as they point to actual remoteness. It is in this sense only that the longer-term settlement,
which does not violate the letter of the rule, violates its spirit, while
the shorter term settlement can be defended as a mere technical
transgressor. But the relevance point is the next and central argument for wait-and-see.
Wait-and-see is more relevant
Prima facie, the point of superior relevance is easily made. No
rule of law should turn on flights of fancy, and the common law
rule does- at least sometimes. The strongest imaginable case for
determining validity ab initio is still no case at all for considering
possibilities which are non-existent or fantastically remote. And, on
this, there is no denying the guilt of the common law rule. The
Leach collection of unborn widows, fertile octegenarians and kindred curios would drown dissent in laughter. 2
51. The draftsman is advised, in the American Law of Property, to
select "a dozen or so healthy babies from families noted for longevity," 6
American Law of Property § 24.7 (Leach and Tudor eds. 1952). For
specimen perpetuities savings clauses, into which such a selection might conveniently be inserted, see Stephenson, Drafting Wills and Trust Agreements
Dispositive Provisions 387-88 (1955). It is true that such clauses, if used as
boilerplate, may do more harm than good. Shattuck and Farr, An Estate
Planner's Handbook 290-91 (2d ed. 1953). But this is true of any standard
clause. Tailored to the case at hand, such a clause offers the substantial advantage of continuing the duration of contingent interests in a long-term
trust well beyond the lives of the testator's beneficiaries who were in being
at his death. In substance, this device permits the draftsman to approach the
creation of contingent interests for a period in gross measured by the lifespan of the survivor of a group, some member of which is likely to live
well past three-score-and-ten.
52. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 731-34 (1952); Leach, Perpetuitics in a
Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 642-46 (1938).
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A minor weakness of this case is that its best illustrations prove
too much. The most outrageous cases (those of truly impossible
possibilities) " cannot establish the superior relevance of actualities
to possibilities because they are irrelevant to both. The apparent
remedy for these is merely to look at the facts ab initio; it is unnecessary to wait-and-see."
Seemingly, the case suffers little from this loss. It is certainly
possible that son John, aged 55, happily married and possessed of
several adult children, will ultimately be survived by a spouse as
yet unborn. Still, the proposition that a remainder to John's children who survive his "wife" should be invalid under the common
law rule because of the possibility of the event is adequately asinine
to make the relevance point with emphasis. But here, the trouble is
that, as a matter of common law, a present-day court might well
avoid invalidity by construction." Indeed, this is a present-day
possibility in the case of any contingency so remote as to have been,.
presumptively at least, beyond the contemplation of the testator.5
53. E.g., the possibility that a woman past the menopause will bear a
child. A recent sample is Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Orphans Ct.
1950) involving a 62 year old woman who had undergone surgery which insured that she would not bear children.
54. This is the statutory remedy recommended by the Law Reform Committee for impossible possibilities of parenthood. Law Reform Committee,
Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 9 (1956).
55. See Batchelor Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C. 310 (Orphans Ct. 1949)
in which the court reasoned that the reference in the will to spouses of thenmarried children should be construed to mean those persons who were spouses
at the execution of the will, thus avoiding the unborn widow problem.
56. See Bryson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 196 S.W.2d 532,
542-43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), where the court avoided the problem of afterborns by holding that the grantor and his wife (aged 57 and 46 respectively at
the date of the transfers in question and the parents of nine children at that
time) did not intend to include their own after-born children because they
did not expect to have more children. For later chapters in this involved litigation, see Bryson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 211 S.W.2d 304
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948), rev'd, 148 Tex. 86, 219 S.W.2d 799 (1949). In
Stanton v. Stanton, 140 Conn. 504, 101 A.2d 789 (1953), the court held
"descendants" to mean descendants who were living when the will in question became operative, thus avoiding the conclusion that a private trust had
been intended to endure throughout the duration of the lineal line of testator's
parents. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 99 A.2d 224
(1953), the court concluded that testator had intended to limit bequests to the
heirs or appointees of the children of his brother and sisters to heirs or
appointees of children who were living at testator's death, though the parties
apparently had stipulated the belief of the testator that his brother and
sisters could not have more children.
Arguendo, the constructional escape is approaching a routine matter
in cases of administrative contingencies. See Cambron v. Pottinger, 301 Ky.
768, 193 S.W.2d 412 (1946); Stanton v. Stanton, 140 Conn. 504, 101 A.2d
789 (1953); Emerson v. Campbell, 84 A2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1951); In re
Swingle's Estate, 480
178 (Ohio
Kan. 529,
P2daff'd,
778 (1955);
Central
Trust
Co., 104 N.E.2d
C.P.289
1951),
92 OhioBraun
App. v.
110,
109 N.E.2d
476 (1952) (an interesting case because it was argued that a power to select
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Moreover, both the impossible cases and the very unlikely ones

are specific enough to invite remedial legislation that is equally
specific as Professor Simes has suggested.57 Some of the current
recommendations of the Law Reform Committee are of this character 5 8 Indeed, as existing remedial legislation suggests, it is even
possible to go further and revise some specific types without regard
to likelihood of contingencies on the premise that the testator would
prefer the revision to invalidity.5
Of course, these judicial and statutory departures from the rigor
of the common law rule have been used to argue that the common
law's reliance on possibilities is demonstrably breaking down. 0 But
the counter to this is clear enough: the assertion that this same
evidence shows instead and in like degree the adequacy of limited
judicial and legislative remedies."1 Moreover, the assertion gains
strength from the fact that the Leach collection, though of extraordinary quality, is a relatively homogeneous one and from the
further fact that any specific silly case can be dealt with by these
limited means. 62 So, abruptly, the relevance issue becomes more
assets which would qualify for the marital deduction trust under a formula
clause was so worded as to make the creation of the trust contingent upon
the executor's exercise of the power). Cf. Brownell v. Edmunds, 209 F.2d 349
(4th Cir. 1953).
See generally 6 American Law of Property § 24.7 (Leach and Tudor
eds. 1952).
57. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707,
735-37 (1955).
58. See the Committe's recommendation regarding possibilities of afterborns, Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 15 (1956).
The Committee also recommends specific statutory remedies for unborn
spouses, id. at 15, and class gifts which are valid only as to some members
of the class, id. at 14.
59. The provision of the Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut statutes,
cutting age contingencies in excess of twenty-one down to twenty-one to
avoid invalidity is an example of this sort of statutory change. See Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 184A, § 2 (1955) ; Conn. Gen. Stat § 2913d (Supp. 1955) ; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. c. 160, § 28 (Supp. 1955). These provisions follow Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 20, § 163 and were anticipated by the
New Hampshire decision of Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 At. 900
(1891). See Leach, PerpetuitiesReform by Legislation: England, 70 Harv.
L. Rev.1411, 1414 & n.28 (1957).
60. Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule Against
Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 129, 140-45 (1954).
61. As to the extent of constructional escape, see note 56 supra. Professor Leach has avoided this trap, carefully arguing for judicial change where
possible, but conceding that, in many states, stare decisis makes legislative
change necessary. See, e.g., Morris and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities
29-35 (1956) ; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign
of Terror,65 Harv.,L. Rev. 721, 745-49 (1952).
62. In his renowned article, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, Professor Leach
helps to make this point, stating, "Mistakes of this sort are readily classifiable
into frequently recurring types." 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 643 (1938). He then
lists the "fertile octogenarian" cases, the "unborn widow" case, and the
"administration contingency" cases. Id. at 643-45. Fourteen years later, when
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pointed. It is not possibilities versus actual events, but real possibilities versus actual events.
Again, prima facie, this point is easily made. The common law
rule turns on possibilities of contingency, continued beyond lives in
being and twenty-one years, which lead to overly attenuated estate
plans. This, then, is the apparent evil at which the rule strikes. But
this is an actual evil, which is dealt with specifically, and completely,
by a test of actual remoteness. Thus viewed, a possibilities test is
not silly because it turns on silly possibilities. It is silly because it
turns on possibilities in the first place-when the evil aimed at is
the actual event.
We are down, then, to the rule's objective. If it is to limit the
duration of future estates and nothing more, a possibilities test is
demonstrably absurd, and preoccupation with the cases of silly
possibilities is mere treatment of symptoms while ignoring the disease as Messrs. Leach and Morris suggest.6 3 However, if the rule
is properly concerned with possibilities of remoteness as such, and
not merely as indicia of actual remoteness, we have a more difficult
question. At this point, the essentials of the case for possibilities
presenting his case against the common rule, Professor Leach can go no
further than to re-name his "administration contingency" category "The Case
of the Magic Gravel Pit," and to add the "Precocious Toddler" to the "Fertile
Octogenarians." Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign
of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 731 (1952). In addition, the problem of
dealing with age contingencies in excess of twenty-one has been solved by
legislation in several jurisdictions. See note 59 supra. In fact, the problem
of unlikely procreation has been dealt with in a specific recommendation for
statutory change by the Law Reform Committee. Law Reform Committee,
Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 9, 15 (1956). So has the unborn widow
problem, id. at 15. The administration contingency type of case is being
dealt with fairly successfully by the current cases, which, on one basis or
another, typically fail to find a violation. See note 56 supra (second paragraph). However, Illinois and Kentucky have enacted statutory provisions
designed to deal with this problem. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 30, § 153(a) (1955) ;
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381220 (Baldwin Supp. 1957). For a brief discussion
of these provisions, see 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1957).
It may be noted that the Massachusetts statute, which was sponsored by
Professor Leach and subsequently enacted in Maine and Connecticut (note
59 supra), does nothing to draw the teeth of the common law rule in administrative contingency cases unless the happening of the contingency is "limited
to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in, or
lives of, persons in being." Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184A, § 1 (1955).
Indeed, Professor Leach borrowed a specific statutory solution for the
problem of age contingencies in excess of twenty-one for his Massachusetts
legislation. See note 59 supra. And the Law Reform Committee's report adds
another specific recommendation for legislation to uphold class gifts valid only
as to some members of the class. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report,
Cmd. No. 18, at 14 (1956). This recommendation accepts an earlier Leach
objection to the common law doctrine. See Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
63. Leach and Morris, Book Review, 4 Mich. L. Rev. 580, 581-2
(1956).
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the case must be a relevance case; here lies

Miscellany
There are other arguments for wait-and-see. Some of these turn
out, upon inspection, to be points already made. Some are spurious.
Some have merit:
a. Intricacy- A much-damned feature of the common law rule,

resulting from the possibilities test, is the sheer intricacy of its
doctrine. 64 But it is difficult to make much of this alone. Our twentieth century legal system is rife with broader areas which are at
least equally intricate, and consequently harass the general practitioner and his client far more than the rule against perpetuities,
e.g., income and transfer taxation. Moreover, the rule exists to curb
the wishes of the testators to whom it applies. This means that intricacy can be justified if necessary to the objectives of the rule,
which returns us to the central question: the relevance of possibilities versus actual events to those objectives.
b. Partiality-A

conspicuous feature of the common law rule,

65

already noted, is the ease with which it can be violated unwittingly.
Conversely, as we have seen,68 a draftsman who is wise in the ways
of the rule can not only stay within permitted bounds, but manipulate those bounds to a considerable degree. It can be argued, therefore, that the rule puts a premium upon specialization and discriminates unfairly against the general practitioner and his client. But
this is the other side of the point, already made, that the actual
events test aims more specifically at the deliberate violator.86 Therefore, it adds nothing to the case and is, like the earlier point, subordinate to the central question of relevance. If possibilities are
sufficiently relevant, it is proper to turn validity on possibilities,
even to the detriment of the good faith transgressor. Moreover, both
points are weakened by the availability of both flexible construction
and specific remedial legislation to deal with specific traps for the
unwary.68
64. In this connection, the comment of John Chipman Gray is worth
recalling: "That I have done all my own sums correctly, I do not venture
to hope. There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error...
A long list might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with regard to
its questions made by eminent men...." Gray, the Rule Against Perpeuities xi
(4th ed. 1942). For some damning, see Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective:
Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 722-23 (1952).
65. See p. 53 supra.
66. Ibid.
67. See p. 54 supra.
68. See pp. 55-57 sup ra.
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c. Superior consistency-

This is a tempting argument for a

wait-and-see advocate. It combats the pervasive notion that the common law rule, though intricate, is a symmetrical structure of shining
logical which should not be marred by tinkering. And, arguendo, it
is a necessary argument in view of Professor Leach's prior, and
highly quotable, portrayal of the rule as a Gibraltar of certainty in
a changing world. 9
Like most arguments, this one rests on an assertion. The assertion is that, by construction and by doctrine as well, the common
law rule has been moving away from an absolute possibilities test
and toward a criterion of actual events. The argument is, of course,
that in the interest of consistency, we should stop flip-flopping between possibilities and actualities and settle on the latter. But, in
the eyes of those to whom consistency is King, this is an argument
which backfires with a vengeance.
First, conceding the assertion, the case is self-defeating. To
make the argument, it is necessary to damn the common law rule
for avoiding the sillier results of the possibilities test.70 This places
an advocate of wait-and-see on both sides of the matter. (Furthermore, if he presses the consistency point it leaves him on the wrong
side, and will cost votes elsewhere.)
Second, the assertion is foredoomed to linger as an argument,
71
for inconsistency cannot be demonstrated at the doctrinal level.
69. Quoted in note 25 supra.

70. Whereas, of course, wait-and-see advocates have made much of the

virtue of those decisions in Florida, New Hampshire and Massachusetts
which evidence discontent with the harsh results of an unadultered possibilities test. See Story v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156
So. 101 (1934) ; Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900 (1891) ; Merchants Nat Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A2d 207 (1953) ; Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952). The Story case is lauded in
Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
Harv. L. Rev. 721, 730 (1952), and the case of Edgerly v. Barker is also
approved strongly, id. at 735. The Curtisand Sears cases pick up their kudos
in Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1349, 1352 (1954).
71. Mr. Tudor made an effort in this direction. Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited
Relic, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 129 (1954). But this effort serves far better to illustrate the weakness of his point than to establish it. To review briefly:
(a) Mr. Tudor asserts (at pp. 136-37) that the sub-class or Cattlin v.
Brown, 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Ch. 1853), exception to the
doctrine of Jee v. Audley, (1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787),
and Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817), is inconsistent with the major premise of the latter cases that a class gift is
invalid unless it is valid as to all members of the class. But of course
the sub-class rule is not inconsistent with that premise. As a matter of
doctrine, each sub-class is a separate class for purposes of the class gift
rule. Moreover, there is a substantial economic difference between a
group of sub-classes and a single larger class, namely that (perpetuities
aside) the shares of the individual members of each sub-class are de-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:41

Inconsistency exists, if at all, at the level of construction, which
means, inevitably, that the whole issue is entwined with the various
presumptions favoring validity,7 2 mired in the details of the instrupendent only upon the membership of that sub-class, and this is a
distinction having far broader consequences than those relevant to perpetuities. 6 American Law of Property § 24.29 (Leach and Tudor eds.
1952); Restatement, Property § 389, comment a (1944). Of course, it
may be most difficult, on the specific language of a particular instrument, to draw the distinction; maybe a judge in a perpetuities case will
tend to draw the distinction so as to favor validity; maybe he won't.
Whether he will or not is irrelevant to doctrinial inconsistency.
(b) The argument is made (34 B.U.L. Rev. at 137-38) that the application of the rule to powers (wherein standard doctrine permits the court
to consider events occurring between the creation and exercise of a power
in determining whether the appointment is valid) is inconsistent with
the possibilities test But Professor Simes has given the obvious and conclusive answer to this contention. Interests created by the exercise of a
power are created when the power is exercised. Simes, The Policy
Against Perpetuities, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 728 (1955). In order to
combat this point, an inconsistency advocate must reply that, in theory
the donor of the power is the conveyor. But this merely proves that the
perpetuities doctrine was developed by people who were sensible enough
not to swallow the general powers theory whole when to do so would
lead to silly consequences; it has nothing to do with internal inconsistency of the perpetuities doctrine itself. What have the rules which
measure the period of the rule from the creation of a special or (commonly) general testamentary power, while measuring from the exercise
of a general power presently exercisable, to do with the rules regarding
facts to be taken into account in passing on the validity of an appointment? Sensibly, the former rules turn on the relative degree of control
over the subject property typically retained by the donor of these three
classes of powers. Sensibly, this degree of control is irrelevant in deciding which facts to take into account in passing on the validity of
appointments.
(d) Finally, the point is made (34 B.U.L. Rev. at 138-40) that the common law rule regarding the splitting of contingencies is inconsistent with
Mr. Tudor's "second rationale" for the possibilities test, i.e., "that the
heir should not be kept out of his inheritance on mere possibilities." (Id.
at 139.) But of course, this rationale, if taken literally, is inconsistent
with the existence of contingent future interests at all, since any contingency makes the right of the testator's heirs dependent upon future
events. Thus, Mr. Tudor says in substance that the rule permitting a
testator to split a contingency is inconsistent with the view that contingent future interests should not be permited. This is true, but such
a view of contingent interests is foreign to the common law rule. In fact,
Mr. Tudor does not put the matter quite so baldly. He points out instead that at common law a most unlikely contingency, which the
testator has split and which is certain to vest if at all within the period
of the rule, can defer determination of ultimate ownership in contravention
of the interests of heirs. (Id. at 139.) At this point, he has established
that a testator who was fond of creating awkward situations but wholly
disinterested in an effective disposition of his property, could, within the
rule, bequeath his estate to his youngest cross-eyed lineal descendant in
being when Hell freezes over, if Hell freezes over within twenty-one
years after the death of the survivor of two-dozen named healthy babies.
Perhaps this is true, or perhaps such a testator would be held to have
died intestate for want of testamentary capacity. It is not, however, too
difficult to explain this omission in the common law rule.
72. Mr. Tudor recognizes this, of ocurse. See Tudor, Absolute Certainty
of Vesting Under the Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic,
34 B.U.L. Rev. 129, 140-43 (1954). But he attempts to equate the existence
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ment before the court and lost in the fog surrounding judicial stimulus and response.
Third, there is the matter of comparisons. While wait-and-see
as originally enacted in Pennsylvania, 73 borrowed in the 1957 Vermont legislation, 7' and recommended by the Law Reform Committee, 75 is true to actualities themselves, the doctrine in this form
has been widely criticized as rendering the eligible measuring lives,
and consequently the period of the rule, uncertain.76 Perhaps this
matter can be dealt with through technical amendment,77 but no
such amendment has been enacted in those states or recommended
by the Committee. Instead, the remedy which has been devised is
that employed in the Massachusetts,7 8 Maine' and Connecticut 0
statutes. As modified in the statutes of these states, the wait-and-see
doctrine does not wait and see at all unless the duration of contingent interests is measured by life estates in or lives of persons
in being at their creation. (Which restrictions effectively limit actuof the presumption with judicial dissatisfaction with the possibilities test,
stating that the usual justification in terms of a presumption that the testator
intended to make a valid gift is pretty thin. Id. at 141. Specifically, he objects
that, after all, the testator knows little about the intricacies of the law of
perpetuities. Ibid. Well, so what? How many clients wish to make invalid
testamentary dispositions? Is there any reason for ignoring this generalized
testatorial desire to achieve a valid disposition? As Professor Simes puts it:
If the testator knew of the rule against perpetuities, it is only fair to
assume that he intended the meaning which would avoid its application.
And, even if he may not have known about it, the presumption that he
intended a valid and not a void disposition, and that he did not intend
to die intestate as to any of his property, should lead us to take the construction which is valid under the rule. Simes and Smith, The Law of
Future Interests 228 (2d ed. 1956).
It will be noted that Professor Simes' statement combines the presumption favoring validity under the rule with the presumption against intestacy,
which, of course, will also find application in supporting validity in the
typical perpetuities case. Moreover, there is also the well-known presumption
favoring early vesting, which reinforces the other two in many perpetuities
cases. 6 American Law of Property § 24.19 (Leach and Tudor eds. 1952).
An examination of the current cases in which construction is more or less
strained to achieve validity under the rule will reveal indiscriminate appeal
to any or all of these presumptions. See cases cited note 56 stpra. It is true
that the results of these cases strongly suggest judicial refusal to adhere to
the test of possibilities, as to administrative contingency cases in particular.
Ibid. But there is very little in the language used by the courts to demonstrate
deliberate avoidance of the possibilities test via construction.
73. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, perm. ed., 1950) tit. 20, § 301.4 (Purdon
1950).
74. Vt Acts (1957) a. 177 § 1, quoted in note 23 supra.
75. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Gmd. No. 18, at 10, 13
(1956).
76. See pp. 42-43 supra.
77. See note 96 infra for a discussion of possible statutory approaches.
78. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184A, § 1-6 (1955).
79. Me. Rev. Stat Ann. c. 160, §§ 27-33 (Supp. 1955).
80. Conn. Gen. Stat §§ 2912d-2916d (Supp. 1955).
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alities to certain possibilities, besides leaving some of Professor
Leach's horror cases untouched.) Moreover, this modified doctrine
waits only until those lives terminate to become an old fashioned
possibilities test. Surely any inconsistency within the common law
rule is well out of focus at this point.
Finally, we have already examined, and found wanting, an
alternative argument based on this same assertion-the argument
that common law departures from the possibilities test show generalized dissatisfaction with the test itself., In this latter context
the assertion may be conceded and effectively countered with the
argument that the same evidence proves, instead and in like degree,
the capacity of the common law rule, as is, to effect any needed
reforms.82 And, a wait-and-see advocate's best refuge from this
last point is a return to the issue of relevance.88
All this at least implies the futility of the assertion itself, and
the wisdom (from the viewpoint of the wait-and-see advocate) of
sticking with the issue of relevance.
d. Pre-emption-The wait-and-see doctrine has been in the arena for only a decade. It is supported by legislation in five states
which offer three different versions."4 Beyond this, it is supported
by a recent English Committee Report, in a fourth version. 5 This
means that in current popularity it stands a poor third behind the
common law rule and the various versions of the New York statutory rule. 6 On these facts, to proclaim victory for wait-and-see is to
invite unwelcome comparisons, e.g., May 1 baseball standings.
81. See pp. 56-58 supra.

82. Ibid.
83. See p. 54 supra.
84. All of these statutes embrace the principle of considering actual
events subsequent to the creation of the interest in deciding the issue of
validity. However, the Massachussets, Maine and Connecticut statutes restrict this principle to interests limited to take effect at or after the termination
of life estates in or lives of persons in being. See discussion at p. 61 supra.
For statutory references, see notes 78-80 supra. The Pennsylvania statute
does not so limit the principle and hence permits actual events occurring
throughout the perpetuities period to be considered. See discussion at p. 61
supra. For the language of the Pennsylvania statute, see p. 42 snpra.
Arguendo, the Vermont statute, while it embraces the Pennsylvania form
of wait-and-see, is a third version because the wait-and-see language is
coupled with enactment of a cy pres rule to deal with invalid interests. It can
be argued, however, that the cy pres portion of the Vermont statute relates to
the separable problem of the disposition of property in the event of invalidity.
For the Vermont provision, and some discussion, see note 23 supra.
85. The Law Reform Committee's recommendations contemplate a considerably more detailed statutory structure than has been enacted in any of
the United States. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18
(1956). For a brief discussion of the Committee's recommendations, see Leach,
PerpetuitiesReform by Legislation: England, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1411 (1957).
86. The Restatement of Property lists 32 states which followed the common law rule without substantial modification as of January 1, 1944. Restate-
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Nevertheless, there is a point of substance here. It is pretty clear
that some revisions of the common law rule are in order s7 and
surely the fewer rules against perpetuities we have among the
several states, the better.88 One rule is enough of a task to master,
and estate plans of these days often cross state lines. Accordingly,
notwithstanding its limited acceptance and unwelcome differences
of detail,89 the wait-and-see doctrine rates a clear preference over
alternative remedies which are only equally promising.
In summary
At bottom, the case for wait-and-see is largely a relevance case,
resting on a single assumption. The assumption is that the evil at
which the common law rule strikes flows from actual remoteness,
that the purposes of the rule can be achieved by preventing contingent interests from remaining contingent too long.
If the assumption is correct, or substantially correct, a possibilities test cannot be justified, for it is merely a clumsy method
of preventing the actual event. Moreover, it is a method which (a)
tends to punish small transgressions in the innocent with lesser
deterrent effect on the well-advised testator who aims deliberately
at a family settlement of maximum duration, and (b) is unnecesment, Property, Introductory Note at 2133-35 (1944). Since that date,
Indiana, Michigan and Wyoming have restored the common law rule by
statute. See Comment, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1158 (1950). As of January 1, 1944,
13 states followed various versions of the New York statutory rule against
suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Restatement, Property, Introductory Note at 2135-36 (1944). Two of these were Indiana and Michigan,
previously referred to as having restored the common law rule. In addition,
California and North Dakota have revised their statutes in the direction of
the common law rule. Cal. Civ. Code § 715.1 (Deering Supp. 1955) (discussed
in Fraser and Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the AIbsolte Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities, 4
Hastings L.J. 101 (1953)); N.D. Rev. Code §47-0227 (Supp. 1953). As previously noted, five former common law jurisdictions have now shifted to the
wait-and-see
See to
pp. the
41-42
supra.law
Therule,
net result
of all
this is that
30
states
adhere doctrine.
substantially
common
11 states
(including
California and North Dakota) have varying forms of the New York rule and 5

states have waLt-and-see.

87. Professor Simes, the most consistent critic of wat-and-see, is
flatly committed to legislative revision of the common law rule. In his words :
"It is, I think,

obvious that nothing short of legislative action can adapt the

Rule to the requirements of modern society." Simes, Public Policy and the

Dead Hand 71 (1955).

88. Having struggled with the Montana mutation of the New York
statutory rule, I feel somewhat qualified to insist that this area of the law
of property, being simultaneously

intricate and litigated with relative infrequency in the reported cases of many states, is one in which uniformity is
highly desirable. For the tragi-eomedy of this struggle, see Waterbury,
Montana Perpetuities Legislativ on
-- Plea for Reform, 16 Montana L. Rev.
17 (1955).
89. See notes 84, 85 supra.
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sarily intricate. Finally, the wait-and-see doctrine has received
sufficient legislative acceptance to merit top billing as a prospective
remedy, if the relevance point be conceded. We turn now to the
case for possibilities.
b. The case for possibilities
As we have observed, the case for possibilities must be a relevance case. The required assertion is, "While it is true that possibilities are relevant to the actual event, and that, in this respect,
actualities are obviously more relevant, the test of possibilities has
relevance for other reasons, viz:..."
What are the reasons? Professor Leach says that he does not
recall seeing any. 90 Professor Simes says, "It is of the essence of the
Rule against Perpetuities that we must be certain whether an
interest is valid or void. . . .There is a social policy involved in
determining the validity of an interest at an early date; and the
Rule against Perpetuities is grounded on that policy." 91 But why
is it of the essence of the rule that validity be determined at the outset? What is the social policy served thereby? It has been argued
that the posibilities test restricts the perpetunities period.
Possibilitieslimit the perpetuitiesperiod
Professor Simes made this point some time ago, observing that
the possibilities test forced selection of measuring lives at the
creation of the interest, thus preventing the use of hindsight to select
92

long-lived individuals.

The Massachusetts legislation has solved the technical problem
of selecting measuring lives under wait-and-see by resorting to
delayed selection on a possibilities basis, the selection being made
as of the termination of lives which, under the terms of the instrument, must terminate before vesting can occur.93 But it is not clear
that this solution avoids the selection of measuring lives with the
substantial benefit of hindsightf 4 The Pennsylvania statute does
not attempt a solution to this problem.
90. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Ride's Reign of
Terror,65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 730 (1952).
91. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 66 (1955).
92. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and
See" Doctrine,52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 188 (1953).
93. See pp. 61-62 supra.
94. Under the Massachusetts statute, in cases in which no savings
clause has been employed, a measuring life which could not satisfy the common law possibilities test at the creation of the challenged interest may satisfy
it on the basis of facts occurring during the continuance of life estates. Professor Leach makes this clear with his illustration of the operation of Section
1 of the statute as applied to an unborn widow case. Leach, An Act Modify-
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However, conceding the existence of this weakness in the Pennsylvania legislation, and the possibility of its existence in Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut, there is a broader answer.
It is true that, at common law, the possibilities test serves two
functions. As a criterion for the selection of measuring lives, it
serves to establish the period of the rule. And as a criterion of compliance, it serves to determine validity under the period thus established. But it does not follow that an actual events test must be
similarly relied upon to do double duty.
If the actual events test is relied upon to select measuring lives,
the logical result is the nonsense of which Professor Simes complains-any life which was in fact in being at the creation of the
interest may be used to establish the period of the ruleY5 But given
an actual events test of compliance, the period of the rule may be
established by any means thought appropriate. Thus, for example, it
may be coupled with a narrowed selection of measuring lives so as
to yield a rule which limits the duration of estate plans much more
ing and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities, 39 Mass. L.Q. 15, 17-18
(1954). This being so, what would be the result in Massachusetts if a trustee
were given power to select new measuring lives at any time prior to the
termination of such life estates? Obviously, there is a strong case for the conclusion that such action by the trustee is merely another "fact" to be given
due recognition in passing on the validity of the interest when the life
estates have terminated. Cf. the common law savings clause employed in
Zweig v. Zweig, 275 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) :
"Said trustees and their successors in trust shall hold and administer
such fund from the time when same comes into their hands and until
twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last of the trustees named, at
which time the trustees then acting, may, if they elect to do so, and can
legally do so, extend the time of such trust for a period of time within
their discretion."
The savings clause involved in the Zweig case is "different," but does the
difference merit a distinction? The trustee's power is aimed specifically at
elongating the estate plan, while, presumably the husband in Professor
Leach's illustration did not avoid taking an unborn second wife in order to
comply with the rule. But can such a distinction be drawn in the face of longcontinued judicial approval of savings clauses prepared ab initio, the function of which is also to elongate the permitted period?

Of course, the common law's restrictions on measuring lives do not
add up to a requirement of actual relevance to the testator's family situation.
The requirement of the possibilities test is merely that of a causal connec-

tion between termination of the lives and vesting, or failure, of contingent

interests (the required causal connection being that an interest must be
certain to vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after the lives terminate). This causal connection may be supplied naturally, as in a gift to A for
life, remainder to A's surviving children. Or it may be supplied artificially, as
with a savings clause which provides for vesting, at the latest, twenty-one
years after the termination of specified lives in being. In this latter case,
the only limitation on the use of unrelated lives is the generous restraint imposed by the requirement of a workable maximum number. Restatement,
Property § 374 (1944). Cf. the English Royal Lives clauses, discussed in Law
Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 6-7 (1956).
95. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and
See" Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 186-87 (1953).
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severely than the common law rule, e.g., a wait-and-see rule under
which the permitted period is limited to the life of the transferor's
spouse (if any) and twenty-one years. Or, in contrast, it may be
coupled with a more liberal selection of measuring lives than at
common law so as to sanction estate plans even more elongated
than the century-long arrangements which are possible at common
law.

96

96. The difficult problem is to achieve a method of selecting measuring
lives which will yield approximately the same maximum period as the common law rule (conceding that the common law rule is not notably restrictive
in this respect, see note 94 supra, second paragraph). Arguendo, the Massachusetts method devised by Professor Leach will still permit selection with
the benefit of hindsight, if the draftsman has the forethought to include a
power of selection in his instrument in the first instance. See note 94 supra,
first paragraph. (Though it would seem quite feasible to plug this possible
loophole in Massachusetts with a specific statutory prohibition.) Moreover, the
Massachusetts statute is a long way from an unrestricted wait-and-see doctrine a la Pennsylvania. See p. 61 supra. However, Professor Leach's effort
places him well in the van of those who have considered the problem. Cf.
Comment, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1158, 1167-69 (1950). Though his only advice
to Pennsylvania is the helpful suggestion that the matter be left to the courts.
See note 16 .mpra.
As a plausible approach to the Pennsylvania problem, I proffer the
following:
(1) In applying the rule against perpetuities to any contingent interest subject to said rule, the period of said rule may be measured by any measuring lives whose continuance have a cause in fact relationship to the
vesting or failure of said contingent interest.
(2) In the preceding sentence, the term "measuring lives" means one or
more human lives in being when the period of said rule commences to
run and whose continuance had said cause in fact relationship to the
vesting or failure of said contingent interest at that time, provided, however, that if said human lives are so numerous or so situated that evidence
of their continuance or termination is likely to be unreasonably difficult
to obtain, none of said human lives may be measuring lives.
The thought behind this provision is obvious enough: The common law
method of selecting measuring lives requires a particular cause in fact
relationship of the lives to vesting, i.e., a relationship which insures vesting
or failure of the interest within twenty-one years after termination of the
lives. In the above statute, an effort is made to broaden this requirement to
one of a cause in fact relationship, and at the same time to avoid the problem of selection with the benefit of hindsight by the requirement that only lives
having some cause in fact relationship to the continuance or termination of
the challenged interest when the period of the rule commences can qualify.
To elaborate with a couple of examples. Suppose a testamentary gift to
the children of A (a living person) who graduate from Reed College. We
select measuring lives at the outset. They are: (1) A (assuming that he may
have more children) because the maximum membership of the class cannot
be determined as long as A can add more members. (2) Any living children
of A. (If A's living children have graduated from Reed, their lives increase
the likelihood of vesting, or decrease the likelihood of failure, and hence
qualify on either count. What about children of A who are in being but
have not yet graduated from Reed? Their lives increase the likelihood of
vesting or decrease the likelihood of failure, also. Hence they qualify.) (3)
A's present spouse, if any (as a co-source, with A, of additional members of
the class). But not an after-acquired spouse because the required relationship
would not have existed at the commencement of the perpetuities period.
Suppose the same case, but an instrument containing a savings clause
which provides that, if the gift has not sooner vested, it shall vest in those
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In other words, the adoption of wait-and-see in no way prejudges the conflict between those who favor a more restrictive
rule than the common law rule and those who favor a more liberal
one. On the contrary, this step merely serves to remove the aura of
inherent severity supplied by the possibilities test, and to separate
the question of duration from the question of compliance. Prima
facie, this is a turn of events which both simplifies and clarifies the
former issue, and, accordingly, merits the support of those on both
sides of the duration question.
Possibilities are necessary to predictability
It is worth recalling at this point that our case for an actualities
test rested at the point of demonstrating the superior relevance of
actual events to the actual duration of contingent interests. We
raised, and reserved, the ultimate question: to what extent are the
objectives of the rule served by limiting actual duration? The reason
for recalling this is that in the predictability argument we have a
similarly self-evident case for the possibilities test.
Who will deny the superior relevance of the possibilities test to
a prediction of actual duration? Indeed, the prima facie case here
is even stronger. Possibilities are at least relevant to actual duration, but the events which determine actual duration come too late
to aid in a prediction of duration. Therefore, if an accurate prediction of validity is vital to the objectives of the rule, an actual events
test is palpably defective, for it will be necessary, in this event, to
determine validity before contingencies have happened anyway97
and, if so, there is little merit in delaying adjudication.
children of A who have so graduated at the death of the survivor of
TUVWXY and Z (seven unrelated persons in being) ? Here, notwithstanding their lack of family relationship, TUVWXY and Z are permissible
measuring lives because the draftsman has established a cause in fact relationship between the continuance of their lives and vesting or failure of the
gift to A's children.
It may be objected that the proposed statute, as drawn, ignores the fact
that the common law rule applies to class gifts which are vested subject to
open (over the heart-felt disapproval of Professor Leach). Leach, The Ride
Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
Touche! But I would avoid this objection by advocating the proposal of the
Law Reform Committee, validating such gifts in favor of those members of
the class whose interests have vested. See p. 100 infra.
97. At this point, however, it is relevant to notice the common law
doctrine of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, declining to pass upon the question of validity during the existence of concededly valid prior estates. E.g.,
In re Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 193 Atl. 85 (1938); B.M.C. Durfee
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777 (1950). For the evolution of this doctrine in Pennsylvania, see Phipps, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities, 23 Temp. L.Q. 20, 25-33 (1949).
In fact, this wait-but-do-not-see doctrine is neither unqualified nor
widely adhered to. See p. 73 infra. Nor is it an easy one to justify, notwithstanding Professor Leach's supporting argument that it is important to the
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So, without more, let us turn to the ultimate question. Does an
actual events test, solely relevant to actual duration, or a possibilities
test, essential to a determination of validity before the event, best
serve the objectives of the rule? We cannot have the full advantage
of both. A choice is necessary.
The central function of the rule is, as we have seen, to arbitrate
fairly between the testator and his successors."" Our question then
becomes: which is the more important to a fair arbitration; a later
decision based upon the actual duration of a contingent interest,
or an earlier one based upon prediction of its duration?
c. The ultimate question: fairness to interested parties
Of course, for purposes of the question, it is necessary to assume
a permitted period of equal duration under either test, and this
equality is difficult to achieve as we have seen. 99 But we have -also
seen that the variance may favor either side.100 So it may be ignored
for present purposes.
Fairnessto the testator
It would require some boldness to assert that the testator is
disinterested in knowing whether his estate plan will hold water.
Of course, the testator, through his draftsman, has control over the
terms of the will, and hence he is in a position to achieve compliance
with the rule without the necessity of litigation. But in order to be
sure of doing so, the draftsman must avoid the possibility of invalidity whether the legal test is possibilities or actualities. 10' The
rights of remaindermen to postpone adjudication of the validity of their
interests until they can be represented personally rather than theoretically
by guardians ad litem. See p. 70 in!ra. But it is unnecessary, at this stage
of the inquiry, to pass upon the merits of the doctrine. It is sufficient, for
present purposes, to note that such a doctrine did develop and that it has
respectable judicial support. The mere fact that this is so strongly
suggests the absence, in the minds of the appellate judiciary of Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts, of vital reasons for determining validity immediately
upon the creation of an interest. And this should make us suspect that these
reasons are something less than obvious.
98. See p. 52 supra.
99. See note 96 supra.
100. See p. 65 supra.
101. This is not to say that the draftsman must comply with a legal
test of possibilities under an actual events rule. But even this latter statement is a good deal closer to the truth than its antithesis-the proposition
that adoption of wait-and-see spells an end to preoccupation with what may
happen. After all, preoccupation with the latter is the raison d'etre of the
whole law of future interests. Moreover, on the near side of the shadowy
line which separates the unlikely from the absurd, are possibilities which
the draftsman under an actual events test must consider in order to serve
his client well. Finally, while it is true that a draftsman under an actual
events test will be relieved of concern with impossible and absurd possibilities, we have already observed that these can be dealt with sans wait-andsee. See pp. 55-56 supra.
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difference is that if the draftsman slips under the latter test, the
testator still has the law of probabilities working in his favor, while
under the former he does not. Admittedly, under an actualities test
there is a correlative advantage to the draftsman; he is likely to be
dead before his error can be demonstrated. But query whether this
is a meritorious basis for choice?
Further, sometimes in the case of an inter vivos plan, the transferor finds himself on the side of invalidity, 10 2 and in such a case
he does need access to the courts, though, perhaps, it is no major
function of the rule to relieve inter vivos transferors of ill-'considered
transfers. Moreover, an actual events test might interfere with
reformation sought by the transferor to avoid violations of the
10 3
rule.
What stands out thus far, however, is the limited advantage to
the transferor of an actual events test. This criterion will not relieve
him or his draftsman of concern for possibilities, for to be certain
of validity under a test of actual events, it is necessary to exhaust
possibilities. And if his estate plan is an inter vivos one, he may
regret the switch to wait-and-see. The substantial advantage is derived from the enlistment of the law of probabilities in favor of
validity, and some of this advantage can be attained by eliminating
impossible and improbable contingencies through specific legislation.' 0 4 Let us turn, then, to the effect of an actual events tests on
those who claim an interest in the testator's property.
Fairnessto those beneficially interested
When we come to those beneficially interested in the testator's
property, the question of advantage becomes more refined. In every
case, there will be two such groups. One group will favor validity
because the testator has dealt with its members more favorably than
does the law of descent and distribution or the testator's residuary
102. See Olmsted Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 451 (Orphans Ct. 1947),
where the settlor of an inter vivos trust sought to regain corpus, relying in
part upon violations of the rule.
103. See McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81
S.E.2d 386 (1954). Actually, at the creation of this trust in 1944, the settlor
appears to have been 44 years of age and his wife 39. At that time, their
youngest child was but two years old. Prima facie, therefore, there was a
real possibility of after-born children at the inception of the instrument
(which, in fact, provided for that possibility). Moreover, there was a
virtual certainty (confirmed prior to the 1953 litigation date) of after-born
grandchildren. On these facts, the North Carolina courts permitted reformation, relying on invalidity under the rule to justify the alteration of the rights
of grandchildren and great-grandchildren under the reformed instrument.
Query whether this solution would have been available under an actual
events tests ?
104. See p. 56 supra.
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clause. The other group will stand to gain by invalidity through
an intestate or residuary distribution. More specifically, the effect
of the possibilities test is to benefit the testator's immediate heirs
or residuary beneficiaries or their successors at the expense of the
later generations whom the testator has selected., 0 5 Is this a rational
discrimination?
Certainly it is not in the opinion of Professor Leach. But his
argument is that later generations are inadequately represented
under the possibilities test.10 And this argument is not only an inconclusive one on the merits,lT but it invites most unfavorable comparisons. Under an actual events test coupled with a perpetuities
period extending beyond lives in being, who will represent the
interest of the testator's immediate heirs or residuary beneficiaries?
Or do we say that, having found Peace with their Maker, they have
no need of representation? This last is a Christian thought-is it
105. Of course, these two groups may be identical in fact.
106. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror,65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 729 & n.12 (1952).

107. First, the Leach argument is that it is important to the rights of
remaindermen to postpone adjudication of their interests until they are known
persons who can be represented personally rather than by a guardian ad
litem, ibid. But the horror cases in this area to which he refers the reader
do not involve this problem. In both the case of Baylies v. Hamilton, 36 App.
Div. 133, 55 N.Y. Supp. 390 (1st Dept. 1899) to which he refers, and the
case from his practice (as he describes it) the difficulty was a plain error by
counsel for the guardian ad litem of a flesh and blood minor. It is at least
relevant, at this point, to reply that there is nothing in the Massachusetts
wait-and-see doctrine which will insure that the remainderman, when life
estates or lives in being have terminated, will be an independent adult of
sufficient wisdom to select counsel wise in the ways of perpetuities.
Second, query whether the problem of adequate respresentation for
these unborn and unascertained persons is a crucial one where the issue is
validity under the rule against perpetuities? In a perpetuities case, where the
issue of validity is litigated prior to distribution, there will normally be a
trustee involved. And the trustee is almost sure to be with the testator, and
the remaindermen, on the side of validity. For one thing, the typical trustee
of a long-term trust is a professional fiduciary who cannot attract new business by exhibiting indifference to the wishes of the testators currently being
served. For another, the trustee is likely to be somewhat committed to the
validity of the instrument by virtue of a judicious (and entirely proper)
examination of its provisions by the trustee's counsel or legal department
prior to acceptance of the trust. Indeed, since this examination is not infrequently contemporaneous with the preparation of the instrument, it may
well be difficult, as a practical matter, for the trustee to acquiesce in a
subsequent charge of invalidity without accepting some responsibility for
the result.
Finally, if the attack on the trust raises the possibility of hastening
its termination, the trustee has an obvious financial incentive to resist. For a
recent sample of prolonged fiduciary devotion under such circumstances, see
Altemeier v. Harris, 335 Ill. App. 130, 81 N.E.2d 22 (1948), aff'd, 403 Ill.

345, 86 N.E.2d 229 (1949).

Of course, it is common enough to see a perpetuities issue raised in a
trustee's petition for instructions. But query as to the number of cases in
which the impetus for the petition (if it was filed prior to the trustee's final
accounting) was the unprompted curiosity of the trustee?
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an adequate answer? We have arrived, at last, at the heart of the
controversy.
If these immediate successors of the testator have a substantial
interest, it is certainly fair that they should be permitted to litigate
the perpetuities question. And this permission is necessarily denied
by an actual events test which postpones the question throughout
lives in being. The Massachusetts concession to possibilities is of
no advantage here.
The obvious argument for the testator's immediate successors is
that they are entitled to litigate the perpetuities question because
they are the closest relatives of the testator and therefore have a
substantial interest in the disposition of his property. A possibilities
test confers any invalid interests upon these closest relatives. By
contrast, under an actual events test, the ultimate recipients are sure
to be the uncertain successors of these relatives, probably unknown
to the testator and certainly having a lesser claim upon his bounty.
In fact, a survey of current cases strengthens this argument. 08
Thus, the argument just made would be effectively answered if
it were the fact that most perpetuities cases do not arise until the
termination of prior life estates, for, if such were the case, it would
follow that the typical perpetuities plaintiff would not be an immediate successor of the testator. But a survey of current decisions
indicates that a substantial majority of such perpetuities cases are
brought before the courts during the existence of the life estates, 10 9
108. See notes 109, 110 infra.

109. This survey covered about 100 cases, decided under the common
law rule since 1945. These cases all involved a perpetuities problem in
the context of a family estate plan, and cases involving immediate gifts for
debatably charitable purposes were excluded. Of these cases, 77 were clearly
cases involving life estates or the equivalent, and it was possible to determine from the facts given when the case had risen in relation to termination of those life estates. Most of the balance of the 100 cases were discarded
because they involved trusts for a period in gross.
My survey showed 47 cases as being litigated prior to the termination of
these life estates. They were:
Arkansas-Lytle v. Zebold, 299 S.W2d 74 (Ark. 1957).
Connecticut-Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taylor, 133 Conn. 221,
50 A.2d 168 (1946).
Delaware-Stuartv. Stuart, 33 Del. Ch. 501, 106 A.2d 771 (1953) ; Layton v. Black, 99 A.2d 244 (Del. Ch. 1953); Emerson v. Campbell, 32 Del.
C. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1951).
Georgia-Landrum v. National City Bank of Rome, 210 Ga. 316, 80
S.E.2d 300 (1954).
Illitwis-Tree v. Continental I1. Nat Bank & Trust Co., 346 Ill. App.
509, 105 N.E.2d 324 (1952) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399
Ill. 320, 77 N.E.2d 675 (1948); Tolman v. Reeve, 393 Ill. 272, 65 N.E.2d
815 (1946).
Kansas-&I re Trust Estate of Woods, 311 P.2d 359 (Kan. 1957) ; McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.2d 736 (1949).
Kentucky-Maher v. Maher, 139 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.Ky. 1956) ; Thomas
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v. Utterback, 269 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1954) ; First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
Lexington v. Purcell, 244 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1951); Taylor v. Dooley, 297
S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1957).
Maryland-Tilghman v. Frazer, 191 Md. 132, 59 A.2d 781 (1948);
Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A.2d 100 (1947).
Massachusetts-B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89
N.E.2d 777 (1950).
Missouri-Thomson v. Union Nat Bank in Kansas City, 291 S.W.2d
178 (Mo. 1956) ; Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1955).
Nebraska-Tiehenv. Hebernstreit, 152 Neb. 753, 42 N.W.2d 802 (1950).
New Hampshire-Wilkins v. Miltimore, 95 N.H. 17, 56 A.2d 535 (1948).
New Jersey-Federal Trust Co. v. Walsh, 20 N.J. Super. 542, 90 A.2d
119 (1952) ; Forbringer v. Romano, 10 N.J. Super. 175, 76 A.2d 825 (1950);
Wright v. Renehan, 10 N.J. Super. 363, 76 A2d 705 (1950) ; National State
Bank of Newark v. Morrison, 9 N.J. Super. 552, 75 A2d 916 (1950);
Tompkins v. Pryor, 142 N.J. Eq. 523, 60 A.2d 801 (1948).
North Carolina-Finchv. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957) ;
McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954) ;
Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954) ; American Trust Co.
v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948).
Ohio-Cleveland Trust Company v. McQuade, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 120, 133
N.E2d 664 (1955).
Pennsylvania-Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Orphans Ct.
1950); In re Laucks' Estate, 358 Pa. 369, 57 A.2d 855 (1948); Olmsted
Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 451 (Orphans Ct 1947) ; Trainer Estate, 65 Pa. D. &
C. 187 (Orphans Ct. 1948).
South Carolina-Love v. Love, 208 S.C. 363, 38 S.E.2d 231 (1946).
Tennessee-Sands v. Fly, 292 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1956); Harris v.
France, 33 Tenn. App. 333, 232 S.W2d 64 (1950).
Texas-First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Snowden, 276 S.W.2d 571
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Zweig v. Zweig, 275 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955) ; Roberts v. Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Rust v.
Rust, 211 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.), af'd, 147 Tex. 181, 214 S.W.2d 462
(1948) ; Bryson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 196 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946).
Washington-In re Lee's Estate, 299 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1956) ; Kendall
v. Kendall, 43 Wash. 2d 418, 261 P.2d 422 (1953) ; Betchard v. Iverson, 35
Wash. 2d 344, 212 P.2d 783 (1949).
The 30 cases in which perpetuities litigation arose after the termination
of prior life estates or lives were the following:
Delaware-Security Trust Co. v. Cooling, 31 Del. Ch. 423, 76 A.2d 1
(1950); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544
(1947).
Florida-Cartinhourv. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953) ; Adams v. Vidal,
60 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1952).
Illinois-Petersv. Gebhart, 6 I1. 2d 534, 129 N.E.2d 731 (1955) ; Spicer
v. Moss, 409 Ill. 343, 100 N.E.2d 761 (1951).
Kentucky-Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984
(1946).
Maryland-Ringgold v. Carvel, 196 Md. 262, 76 A.2d 327 (1950);
Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 195 Md. 81, 72 A.2d 757 (1950) ; Ryan v. Ward,
192 Md. 342, 64 A.2d 258 (1949) ; Reese v. Reese, 190 Md. 311, 58 A.2d 643
(1948).
Massachusetts-Searsv. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952);
New England Trust Co. v. Woods, 326 Mass. 239, 93 N.E.2d 547 (1950);
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615,75 N.E.2d 3 (1947).
New Hampshire-MerchantsNat Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d
207 (1953).
North Carolina-Claytonv. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 80 S.E.2d 29 (1954);
McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E2d 831
(1952).
Oregon-Heilingv. Daniel, 203 Ore. 123, 275 P.2d 854 (1954).
Pennsylvania-Inre Throm's Estate, 378 Pa. 163, 106 A.2d 815 (1954);
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a' substantial number of them shortly following the testator's
death. 110
Again, commencing with more guarded language,"1 wait-andsee advocates have moved to the assertion that "it is standard
judicial practice for a court to refuse to pass upon a perpetuities
issue as to a remainder until the life estates have terminated and the
trustee is called upon to make distribution."112Obviously, if it were
well settled that a perpetuities plaintiff could not present a justiciable perpetuities issue during the continuance of life estates, it
would be the height of folly to fret about the litigation rights of
immediate heirs of the testator. As a practical matter, they would
have such rights only if by accident they were to survive the life
tenants. And of course, if they were the life tenants, they would
have no such rights at all. It seems, however, that the practicalities
are quite otherwise. A survey of current common law decisions
indicates that, commonly, our courts do accept and decide such
perpetuities cases during the continuance of such life estates."13 I
In; re Throm's Estate, 378 Pa. 159, 106 A.2d 818 (1954) ; Harris Trust, 83
Pa. D. & C. 417 (Orphans Ct. 1953) ; In re Newlin's Estate, 367 Pa. 527, 80
A.2d 819 (1951) ; If re Harrah's Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950) ;
Smith Estate, 73 Pa. D. & C. 38 (Orphans Ct. 1950) ; Batchelor Estate, 67
Pa. D. & C. 310 (Orphans Ct. 1949) ; Cameron v. Kranich, 62 York Leg. Rec.
5 (Pa. C.P. 1947) ; McCreary's Estate v. Pitts, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235
(1946).
Rhode Island-Industrial Trust v. Flynn, 74 R.I. 396, 60 A.2d 851 (1948).
Tennessee-Crockett v. Scott, 284 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1955) ; McCord
v. Ransom, 185 Tenn, 677, 207 S.W.2d 581 (1948).
110. See, e.g., Maher v. Maher, 139 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.Ky. 1956) ; Lytle
v. Zebold, 299 S.W.2d 74 (Ark. 1957) ; In re Trust Estate of Woods, 311 P.2d
359 (Kan. 1957) ; Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957) ;
Sands v. Fly, 292 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1956) ; If re Lee's Estate, 299 P2d
1066 (Wash. 1956) ; Rust v. Rust, 211 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd,
147 Tex. 181, 214 S.W.2d 462 (1948) ; Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188
Md. 178, 52 A.2d 100 (1947) ; Tolman v. Reeve, 393 Ill. 272, 65 N.E2d 815
(1946).
Also, there are cases in which an inter vivos settlor seeks to raise the
issue before his death. McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank, 240 N.C. 1,
81 S.E.2d 386 (1954); Olmsted Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 451 (Orphans Ct.
1947).
111. "It is standard practice in some states to refuse to pass upon
the validity of a remainder until prior estates have terminated." Leach,
Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 721, 729 n.11 (1952).
112. 6 American Law of Property 66 (Leach and Tudor eds. 1952).
See also Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1349, 1358 (1954); Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the
Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 129,
135 (1954).
113. Thus all of the cases cited in the second paragraph of note 109,
supra, were cases in which plaintiff sought an adjudication despite the
existence of prior estates. In one, Stuart v. Stuart, 33 Del. Ch. 501, 106 A.2d
771 (1953), plaintiff successfully extinguished the life estates on a theory
of merger. In the remainder, the life estates were not invalidated. And only in
the Durfee case in Massachusetts and the Laucks' case in Pennsylvania did
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find current cases to the contrary only in Pennsylvania"14 and
Massachusetts,"15 and a number of lower court decisions in Pennsylvania which calmly ignore the problem and adjudicate the
issue." 6 Moreover, an examination of the Pennsyivania and Massachusetts cases leaves one with the strong suspicion that they do
not stand for any fiat rule of prohibition, but rather represent applications of a discretionary rule which permits these courts to refuse
adjudication, absent a showing of current need for adjudication."17
the court decline to pass upon the perpetuities issue. Indeed, in the latter
case, the court did consider the perpetuities question to the extent of determining that the plaintiff was not entitled to present distribution on a theory
of infectious invalidity. True, in only one of the remainder, American Trust

Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948), did the court co);-

sider the question of timeliness, but we are speaking of judicial practice. In
this latter case, the court blandly disregarded the trial court's reservations on
timeliness and then rendered a highly debatable decision on the merits. For
a substantial collection of earlier cases see Annot., 174 A.L.R. 880 (1948).
This note deals with the general question of whether declaratory or advisory

relief regarding future interests will be granted, but a number of the cases discussed are perpetuities cases. The latter reveal substantial variations in result from case to case, depending on the facts.
114. In re Laucks' Estate, 358 Pa. 369, 57 A.2d 855 (1948). And in this
case the court carefully considered the issue of whether prior life estates

were terminable under the doctrine of infectious invalidity, an inquiry not open
under the Pennsylvania wait-and-see doctrine.
115. B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777
(1950). The opinion cited two earlier Massachusetts cases, neither of which
had anything to do with perpetuities questions, but which involved the discretionary question of whether the plaintiff had made a showing entitling
him to present equitable relief. Thus viewed, the Durfee case falls far
short of laying down a flat rule to the effect that perpetuities plaintiffs have
no such interest during the continuance of prior estates. Moreover, the court
acted by way of affirmance of the Probate Judge's decree, and the Judge's

findings of fact were not contested on appeal.

116. Olmsted Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 451 (Orphans Ct. 1947) (passing
on a perpetuities issue without question during the life-time of the settlor of
an inter-vivos trust, at the settlor's request) ; Trainer Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C.
187 (Orphans Ct. 1948) (passing on the validity of an interest during the
continuance of a prior life estate in order that the rights of the remainderman's
creditors might be clarified) ; Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Orphans
Ct. 1950) (a seemingly questionable decision of invalidity rendered on petition of a life tenant seeking trust termination).
117. For a discussion of the Durfee case in Massachusetts, see note
115 supra. For Massachusetts applications of the discretionary rule, see
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Morey, 320 Mass. 492, 70 N.E.2d 316
(1946). In this connection, although the Massachusetts court does not cite
the Morey case in Durfee, it is of interest that the Morey case does cite Hill
v. Moors, 224 Mass. 163, 112 N.E. 641 (1916), one of the two Massachusetts
cases cited by the same court in Durfee as authority for its position.
As to the Pennsylvania doctrine, in addition to the lower court decisions
discussed in note 116 s=pra,it may be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court quite evidently will permit inquiry during the continuance of prior
estates in infectious invalidity cases. See In re Laucks' Estate, 358 Pa. 369,
57 A.2d 855 (1948), which carefully considers the infectious invalidity issue
before holding the perpetuities question otherwise premature. It will also be
observed that, in Laucks, the Pennsylvania court was moved to answer
plaintiff's claim of present interest in determining title to realty on the ncrits,
pointing out that he in fact had no such interest, and by no means indicating
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In this event, even the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases represent only applications (and, arguendo, hyper-applications in some
cases 1") of a well-recognized doctrine of equitable origin under
which some perpetuities plaintiffs have sometimes been tossed out
of court in other states, and sometimes have not."1 9 And if such is
the case, it is not difficult to produce some plausible cases in which
there is a need for such adjudication, if our starting point is the
assumption that validity is to be judged by a possibilities test so that
the testator's immediate heirs do have "rights" immediately upon
20

his death.1

Thus, the claim of immediate successors to litigation rights
will not down on facts or procedure. It must be met on the merits.
And on the merits there is an impressive answer, resting on the
rationale of the perpetuities period. A rule which measures the
permissible duration of future estates in lives, necessarily concedes the testator's right to deny full ownership to his immediate
successors, without ignoring them altogether.' 2' Moreover, there is
appealing common sense in such a rule. These are people whom
the testator knows personally.
He is in a good position to judge them, both as potential beneficiaries and as potential property managers. If he concludes that
they are unworthy of his property, or incompetent to manage it,
that the claim, if substantiated on the facts, would have been disregarded.
Moreover, in the recent case of In re Taylor's Estate, 384 Pa. 550, 121 A.2d
119 (1956), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided an issue of construction regarding a remainder interest of a minor income beneficiary before
it was necessary to decide the question since he was clearly entitled only to
income during minority. And the court relied on perpetuities consequences
in justifying the construction which it adopted.
118. See McCreary's Estate v. Pitts, 354 Pa. 347, 47 A.2d 235 (1946),
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in passing upon the validity of a
trust as to 2 of a testatrix's residuary estate, declined to pass upon the
validity of corresponding provisions of a trust as to the other V2, notwithstanding the fact that, in prior litigation involving these trusts, the court regarded them as sufficiently identical to combine the two in describing their
provisions. See In re McCreary's Estate, 328 Pa. 513, 196 At. 25 (1938).
If, in fact, the provisions of these two trusts were identical, it is difficult to
see the justification for postponing a determination as to the latter.
119. For a substantial collection of earlier cases from various states,
including Pennsylvania, see Annot., 174 A.L.R. 880 (1948).
120. For example, where an inter vivos settlor seeks to terminate a

trust, or where the rights of creditors are involved. See the recent lower court
decisions in Pennsylvania in which the perpetuities question has been adjudicated notwithstanding the existence of life estates, note 116 supra. Note also
the care with which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handled the plaintiff's
assertion of a real property title issue in In re Laucks' Estate, 358 Pa. 369,
57 A.2d 855 (1948) (last paragraph of the court's opinion). And, in the
case of the inter-vivos settlor whose draftsman has erred, there is also the
reformation problem. See note 103 supra.

121. For that matter, is not the entire structure of future estates so
premised, as to both inter vivos and testamentary transfers?
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there is more reason for respecting his opinion as to them than as
to future generations. And if he goes beyond the rule in creating
contingent future estates, it is difficult to see how this fact increases
the likelihood that he was wrong about his heirs.122 Thus, a persuasive answer to the point that an actual events test distributes the
testator's bounty among remote generations is that the testator did
not want his immediate heirs to have control of his property, and
that, as to them, there is good reason for respecting his judgment.
True, an actual events tests leaves us with the related problem
of disposing of invalid interests at the end of a generation or two
with minimum violence to the testator's over-all plan. If the
testator's plan of disposition has excluded some of his heirs or
treated some of them less generously than others, the effect of
invalidity may well be to benefit successors of those whom the
testator has chosen to slight. There is something to be said for the
Pennsylvania statute which attempts to avoid this result, as many
draftsmen of savings clauses have avoided it, by providing for
ultimate distribution to those entitled to income at the end of the
perpetuities period. 2- Another way to avoid it is to employ the more
discriminating device of cy pres.'24 But the possibility that an actual
122. To argue that the foundation of the possibilities test is the thought
that an excessively attenuated estate plan proves the unreasonableness of the
testator's judgment regarding his immediate kindred, in the face of the fact

that that test demonstrably discriminates against the unwitting violator (see
p. 53 supra), is surely to press notions of presumptive cause and effect

well past the point of reason.

123. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 20, § 301.5 (Purdon 1950):
(a) Valid interests following void interests. A valid interest following

a void interest in income shall be accelerated to the termination date
of the last preceding valid interest
(b) Void interests on condition subsequent or special limitation. A void
interest following a valid interest on condition subsequent or special

limitation shall vest in the owner of such valid interest
It may be argued that such savings clauses are not an unmixed blessing
and must be tailored to the particular instrument in question if incongruous
results are to be avoided. See note 49 supra. It can even be argued that, in
some cases, such a savings clause will produce more unsatisfactory results
than invalidity at common law. See, e.g., ts re Lovering's Estate, 373 Pa.
360, 96 A.2d 104 (1953). But at this point it seems fair to ask the critic
to choose common law invalidity, with resulting distribution to remote
successors of the testator's heirs, and some such remedy as the Pennslyvania
statute, or the more flexible remedy of cy pres, note 23 supra. If he would
reply that the proper solution is to retain the possibilities test and permit
immediate successors of the testator to reap the benefits of invalidity, there
are two fair answers. First, to make this reply is to renew an old argument,
for immediate successors are by no means the uniform beneficiaries at present.
See note 108 supra. Secondly, the benefits received by these immediate
successors are, typically, of much less value to them than to subsequent
generations, because, typically, what they receive is a right to a share in

corpus which will not become possessory for a substantial period. See p. 79
infra.
124. A statute which seems to embody this thought has recently been
enacted by the Vermont legislature. See note 23 supra.
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events test might distort the testator's plan cannot make a case for
the common law test of possibilities for the apparent reason that results under the common law rule are not notably respectful of the
desires of the testator.
Nevertheless, the actual events test is a strong remedy. It effectively disfranchises those kindred of the testator who have the
strongest natural claims to his bounty from any litigation of perpetuities questions. In fairness, all arguments in their favor should
be considered.
Broadly, the case for the testator's heirs rests on the proposition
that there ought not to be rights without remedies. But some prima
facie arguments for the possibilities test do not even reach this
point. These find inherent merit in an adjudication of invalidity.
Thus it can be argued that under an actual events test, actual
invalidity can go unpunished. Under such a test, when the measuring lives have terminated, it is quite possible that distribution day
will have arrived and the then-representatives of the testator's
heirs or residuary beneficiaries will be the testator's chosen remaindernen.125 If so, they will not care to litigate any perpetuities
issue with themselves, and presumably it will never be litigated.
But on such facts there is no reason why the issue should be
litigated. The real question is whether immediate successors should
have been permitted to litigate it earlier.
Another similar argument is the proposition that an actual
events test hampers enforcement of the rule against perpetuities.
This argument can be supported by impressive statistical evidence, previously referred to,12 6 in that a majority of perpetuities
cases arise before distribution day at the present time. But the
whole argument is premised upon the merit of an adjudication of
invalidity and fails to reach the question of whether the rule should
be enforced for the benefit of the testator's immediate successors.
Other prima facie arguments for the possibilities test reach the
issue of rights without remedies but assume the sufficiency of the
former to justify the latter. Professor Simes seems guilty of this
when he objects that it is impossible to retain the doctrine of infectious invalidity under an actual events test. 21 His case is stated
in terms of the incongruity of declaring life estates void after they
125. For example, suppose that the testator's sole heir is son S, that
distribution is to occur 25 years after S's death and is to be made, share and
share alike, among the then-surviving children of S who are S's only heirs.

126. See note 109 supra.

127. Simes, Is the Ride Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and

See" Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 188-89 (1953).
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have terminated and the problem of whether to postpone any dis-

tribution until then.12 But the broader objective of the infectious
invalidity doctrine is to preserve equality of treatment between
several lines of descent, equality which the testator has provided
for but which is rendered impossible by invalidity of contingent
interests under the possibilities test in one or more lines. In other
words the objective of the doctrine is to carry out the testator's
wishes, not to preserve the rights of his heirs.129 Viewing the doctrine in this light, it is at least arguable that the adoption of an
actual events test will serve the testator's wishes far more effectively
by respecting his judgment that his heirs ought not to be given
unrestricted ownership of his property. True, this leaves us with
the problem of ultimate disposition under an actual events tests,
but this problem is also present under the possibilities test; moreover, there are several available solutions.'3 0
A similar argument can be made, addressed to alienability. It is
not a broad argument, asserting a public interest, but a narrow one,
asserting an interest of the testator's heirs in free alienability of the
property which they take by inheritance. The argument is, of course,
that the existence of non-justiciable perpetuities questions hampers
alienability by heirs.'"' And the prima facie appeal of the point can
be improved somewhat by substituting the heir's creditors for the
heir.'3- 2 The argument is more appealing in the context of legal
future interests in land, some of which are still being created as the
current decisions demonstrate, 3 3 but it still has some force in the
context of a trust. 3 4 Again, the argument assumes that these heirs
and their creditors are entitled to assert such rights.
128. Id. at 189.
129. Restatement, Property § 402 (1944).
130. See pp. 75-76 supra.
131. Here, reference is to alienability of the interest of the heir, not to
alienability of the property itself. In this way, the present argument neatly
sidesteps our prior conclusions that present-day future interests do not
withdraw property from commerce. Here, the argument is that marketability
of the interest would be increased if doubts caused by perpetuities problems
could be resolved conclusively.
132. See, e.g., Trainer Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 187 (Orphan Ct. 1948).
133. Because, arguendo, the holder of the legal future interest in land
is somewhat less likely to hold it subject to valid restraints on his alienation
of his interest than is the case with respect to equitable interests in a trust.
See 6 American Law of Property §§ 26.88-26.100 (Schnebly ed. 1952). For
recent samples, see Maher v. Maher, 139 F.Supp. 294 (E.D.Ky. 1956);
Sands v. Fly, 292 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1956).
134. The holder of a legal future interest in land is somewhat less likely
to hold it subject to valid restraints on the alienation of his interest than is
the case with respect to equitable interests in a trust. See 6 American Law
of Property § 26.99 (Schnebly ed. 1952). There is substantial authority sustaining the validity of spendthrift provisions as to an equitable future interest
in corpus. Ibid.
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In fact, on the merits, there is no plausible case for enforcement
of the rule by the testator's immediate successors. This is so for
several reasons.
First, these perpetuities plaintiffs gain little for themselves, at
a substantially larger cost to testators' estates. All but a handful
of perpetuities cases arise in a trust context and involve an executor
or trustee. This means expense to the estate, whoever wins. And if
the cases of the past decade are any indication, the vast majority of
perpetuities plaintiffs lose--on the merits.'" 5 In fact, on a reading of
the reports, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a good deal of
this litigation was virtually foredoomed at the outset.Y8 Perhaps
some of it is carried on out of sheer pique at the testator's arrangement. If so, it is difficult to see the point in encouraging such efforts.
Moreover, when a perpetuities plaintiff wins, he ordinarily winds
up with some share in a more or less remote remainder interest,
13 7
marketable, if at all, at a substantial discount from actuarial value.
In fact, if he does market it, this is probably adequate evidence that
the testator was right about him all along. True, if he does not
market it, he has gained something: the right to dispose of a share
of the corpus of the testator's estate even if he does not live long
enough to receive distribution. But unless he is the life tenant, it is
likely that distribution day will occur on or after the termination
of lives which are irrelevant to the successful plaintiff's personal estate plan, which will make it difficult for him to make a useful disposition.
135. In surveying the common law perpetuities cases since 1945, I
sought cases involving a substantial perpetuities issue in the context of a
private estate plan. I settled on about 100 cases, about three-fourths (77)
of which are listed in note 109 supra. Of the latter, 28 involve violations of
the rule. Over-all, my impression after culling through several hundred
more-or-less perpetuities cases decided since 1945 is that there must be easier
ways for an heir to make money. I submit that Professor Leach's lurid titles
(Leach, Perpetuities in Perspectivei Ending the Ride's Reign of Terror,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952) ; Leach, Perpetuities:Staying the Slaughter of
the Innocents, 68 L.Q. Rev. 35 (1952), reflect some poetic license. Insofar as
they imply that the cases of invalidity which arise are typically cases in which
a slight drafting correction could have avoided the difficulty, I wholeheartedly
agree. In only a few cases, e.g., Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W.2d 905 (Ark.
1957) ; Wright v. Renehan, 10 NJ. Super. 363, 76 A.2d 705 (1950), did I find
plans which would be likely to violate an actual events test. But the common
law rule of which I have been reading is not wrecking wholesale havoc with
American estate plans.
136. See, e.g., Tree v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 346 Ill.
App. 509, 105 N.E.2d 324 (1952).
137. There are exceptions of course, cases of merger, Stuart v. Stuart,
33 Del. Ch. 501, 106 A.2d 771 (1953), and infectious invalidity, Taylor v.
Dooley, 297 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1957), but these are conspicuous exceptions.
Indeed, in the Taylor case, the successful plaintiff did not receive her share
free of trust.
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Second, if the testator's immediate successors are to be protected
against capricious testamentary acts, it is sheer lunacy to make the
common law rule the instrument of protection, for the permitted
period at common law exceeds the remaining life span of every heir
of the testator! The proponents of this policy should do it the
honor of urging means adequate to the end, such as an extension of
rights of election against the will. Moreover, the substance of this
point will remain so long as we retain a law of future estates. If the
permitted period of contingency were reduced to twenty-one years
in gross, life estates vesting within that period could easily deny
the fruits of possession to the testator's heirs throughout their lives.
Third, there is no discernible reason why a testator's act of
violating the rule against remoteness points to increased equity in
favor of that unwary testator's heirs. Indeed, since a skilled draftsman can elongate the perpetuities period with considerable success,
it is even arguable that a violation is a badge of innocence. But
this last is unnecessary to the case. Suffice it to say that there is no
apparent reason for discriminating
in favor of the heirs of the
138
testator who violates the rule.
Finally, if a case is to be made for limiting freedom of testation
in the interest of heirs, it would be better to have illusory remedies
removed so that their plight may be clear. Viewed in this light, the
nominally rigorous but practically ineffectual possibilities test is an
affirmative obstacle in the path of reform.
To sum up, it is true that the possibilities test is of some benefit
to the testator's immediate successors. But the benefit is most insubstantial. Typically, it is not available at all. If it is available, rare
cases aside, the benefit is of small cash value and small utility.
Further, the benefit is awarded by the possibilities test on a basis
which defies equation with the strength of plaintiff's claim upon the
testator's bounty. Moreover, the price of the benefit is far too high.
In dollar terms, the aggregate benefit to heirs is accompanied by
a much larger aggregate loss to testators' estates. And the source
of the benefit, the possibilities test, is no more rational in punishing
testators than in benefiting heirs. Indeed, as we have seen, that test
is more a trap for the innocent than an obstacle to the dynastic
testator.
The remaining issue of fairness concerns future generations, and
their right, at some point, to be free from the restraint of their
ancestors in their enjoyment and disposition of ancestral property.
But clearly, an actual events test is better suited to arbitration be138. See note 122 mipra.
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tween future generations and the testator than is a test of possibilities, for an actual events test turns on whether the testator did in
fact so prolong his estate plan as to unduly restrict future generations in the utilization of his property. By contrast, a test of possibilities prejudges that issue.
At this point we are ready to answer the question of fairness,
at least insofar as the testator and his heirs and chosen beneficiaries
are concerned. While the possibilities test does not interfere seriously with testatorial prerogative, its abolition in favor of wait-andsee will eliminate a purposeless and technical hazard to the testator's
plan. Moreover, the advantage is greatest to the testator who lacks
the services of a highly-skilled estate planning specialist. 139 Still
further, the advantage is in the area in which the testator's claim
to preference makes sense; the wait-and-see doctrine respects his
judgment regarding his immediate relatives whom he knows and
can evaluate. As to the testator's chosen beneficiaries, of course
their interest is identical with his, unless they are also his heirs, so
we need not evaluate them separately. As to immediate successors,
the possibilities test is a small, expensive, and capricious exception
to an overall perpetuities policy which plainly subordinates their
claims to freedom of testation. If we are to ignore trivia, and a few
uncommon cases, it merely serves as a vehicle for registering
ineffectual protest against that overall policy. The possibilities test
is, therefore, not even fair to immediate successors, because it gives
them no real relief against a capricious testator, and yet maintains
some posture of rigor so as to conceal their helplessness. Finally, as
to later generations, a test of actual events is superior in fairness,
for it postpones adjudication of issues affecting their interest, permitting them to decide whether, and when, to litigate those issues.
Having answered the question of fairness, as between the testator
and his successors, we have an answer to the question of relevance,
which turns on that of fairness. Since the only substantial function
of a possibilities test, which an actual events test cannot serve, is that
of permitting immediate successors of the testator to litigate perpetuities questions, and since we have decided that these immediate
successors ought not to be permitted to litigate those questions, the
issue of relevance resolves itself. As we observed earlier" ° an
actual events test is inherently more relevant to what actually happens than is a test of possibilities. And we have just decided that,
consistently with fairness to all concerned, it is best to postpone per139. See p. 53 mipra.
140. See p. 57 supra.
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petuities questions until the actual event has occurred. So an actual
events test is superior in relevance to a possibilities test because
actual events are more relevant than possibilities to achieving a fair
balance between the desires of the testator and those of his immediate and remote successors.
We have, then, but one further question. Is retention of the
possibilities test of importance because wait-and-see is a tax dodge?
Or, in other words, is the possibilities test conspicuously superior
in fairness to the Revenue?
Fairness to the revenue
As previously suggested,1 4' this question need not detain us
long. The answer is no.
Marital deduction qualification aside, the federal estate tax on a
testator's estate is not affected by the form of a testamentary transfer. This means that, in the context of testamentary transfers, the
actual events test will only reduce taxes to the extent that it affects
the, tax liability of the testator's successors, and its effect in this
area is necessarily quite limited.
In the first place, as we have seen, the rule is not frequently
violated even under the possibilities testY.42 Second, as we have
observed, the possibilities test is more of a trap for the inadvertent
planner of a relatively small estate than for the perpetuities-wise
43
draftsman of the wealthy testator's truly long-term settlement.
Both of these facts point to a small revenue loss from the change,
and also suggest that the loss to the redistribution policy itself is
likely to be minimal. Third, there is no assurance that the estates of
the testator's successors, even when augmented by their intestate or
residuary shares in invalid interests, will be large enough to yield
much transfer tax revenue or require much redistribution.
It is true that the effect of an actual events test may well be to
defer determination of validity beyond the date of death of some heir
of the testator, so that the value of his share in invalid interests will
have to be determined for estate tax purposes before it is known
whether there are invalid interests. And it is also true that the
uncertainty over invalidity is likely to depress the value of such
potential interests in that heir's estate-possibly to zero. 44 But this
141. See p. 52 supra.
142. See p. 79 supra.
143. See pp. 53-54 supra.
144. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cardeza's Estate, 5 T.C. 202
(1945), aff'd, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949). Though this is by no means a certain
result, see Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 525 nn.

303, 304 (1956).
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advantage is an uncertain one because of the burden of proof on
valuation, which rests with the taxpayer. 145 True, the estate tax
attributable to a reversionary interest may be deferred at the
executor's election until the termination of prior estates. 146 And a
case might arise in which wait-and-see would delay such termination, by validating some prior estates which would be invalid under
a possibilities test. But the election carries with it the multiple
obligations of paying interest on the deferred tax, posting bond
and notifying the Commissioner when such prior interests in fact
do terminate, 47 so it is difficult to make much of a loophole out of
this.
When we turn to inter vivos transfers by the original testator as
an alternative to testamentary disposition, the tax advantage of the
actual events test is scarcely more apparent. In this context, when
Spiegel' s was in flower, and property transferred inter vivos was
being included in testators' taxable estates on the ground that some
reversionary interest was retained, it might have been possible for
the estate to eliminate one source of such a reversionary interestinvalidity under the rule-by arguing that the perpetuities question was premature. 49 However, a much more promising remedy
is to be found in the Pennsylvania provision dealing with the
effect of invalidity which seeks to avoid reversions in favor of distribution to income beneficiaries at the end of the permitted
period. 150 At present, however, the reversionary interest criterion
is pretty well hemmed in by Congressional restrictions, i.e., the five
per cent valuation requirement and the conjunctive requirement of
a condition of survivorship.' 51 It would seem, therefore, that the
utility of the actual events test in minimizing estate taxes on inter
vivos transfers is reduced to the uncertain valuation advantage previously discussed. The advantage is a little greater in this context
because of the practical certainty of an estate large enough to
create the tax problem, but it is still decidedly peripheral.
145. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). (On the facts, this is
a gift tax case, holding that the taxpayer may not deduct from the value of
transferred property a reversionary interest not susceptible of actuarial valuation.) Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 144, at 524.
146. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6163(a).
147. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6601(b).
148. Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), in which an
extremely remote reversionary interest was seized upon to justify inclusion
of the corpus of a trust in the donor's estate under Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 811(c).
149. Though query whether the Court which decided the Spiegel case
would have been deterred by the prematurity of the perpetuities question?
150. For the text of the Pennsylvania provisions, see note 123 supra.

151. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037(a).
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And if a tax-conscious critic of wait-and-see would take a firm
position against whatever minor tax advantages may flow from an
actual events test, there are still two forceful avenues of reply. The
first stems from our previous conclusion that perpetuities policy
and transfer tax policy are properly severable. 15 2 This being so, the
critic is exposed to the admonition that he go to Congress with the
problem. Moreover, it may be added that if he wishes to spend
his time more profitably, from the standpoint of the Revenue,
he should lobby instead for an end to the preferred tax status of
successive estates. 53 The second stems from the obvious fact that
the Commissioner's rights are derivative. In fact, a possibilities test
does take something from the testator's heirs. Save in rare cases, it
is nothing of material importance or value. It is also capriciously
awarded. But it is something. So there is sound basis on the
merits for the small tax advantage which might flow, for example,
from the elimination of an intestate share in invalid interests from
some immediate heir's estate.
3. In Summary
The possibilities test stands convicted, then, of failure to waitand-see. For the predictability which is served by the possibilities
test turns out upon inspection to be an ineffectual and irrational
instrument for the assertion of rights by heirs and those who stand
in their shoes. And while it may be argued that freedom of testation
should be less than it is, and the prerogatives of heirs greater than
they are, it would be necessary to virtually abolish the law of
future estates to protect the latter via the rule against perpetuities.
Plainly, this alternative is indefensible, for the law of future estates
has a function to perform in protecting the families of some testators
against their own limited talents or inexperience. Therefore, we may
properly ask that heirs look elsewhere for relief.
We may justifiably conclude at this point that the wait-and-see
doctrine is deserving of the acceptance which it has received and
that the law of perpetuities will make more sense when that acceptance is universal. But this conclusion, without more, is a minimum
reward, which suggests some attention to corollaries, e.g., what
light has been shed on the propriety of the common law prepetuities
period?
152. See p. 52 supra.
153. Ibid.
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II. COROLLARIES
A. THE PERIOD OF THE RULE

Thus far, as we have seen, preoccupation with the central thesis
of wait-and-see has tended to relegate the period of the rule to the
status of a technical problem, that of securing the advantages of
wait-and-see without permitting the selection of measuring lives
with the substantial benefit of hindsight. 54 Yet the wait-and-see
discussion has provoked thoughtful attention to the present-day
function of the rule, leading Professor Simes to the conclusion,
endorsed by Messrs. Leach and Morris, that the central function
of the rule today is to strike "a fair balance between the desires
of members of the present generation, and similar desires of
succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property
which they enjoy.

'155

We have just demonstrated that the common law possibilities
test is not well suited to this function. What of the common law
perpetuities period? To ask is to answer.
Professor Simes entitled his lecture on the rationale of the
modem rule: The Policy Against Perpetuities: Dead Hand v.
Living Hand.15 But if the proper function of the modem rule is
to arbitrate fairly between the dead and the living, the common law
perpetuities period with its quasi-actuarial savings clauses may
fairly be parodied as a conspiracy of the dead and the unborn
against the living. In fact, such a parody is an understatement.
With the aid of such a clause, a capable draftsman can, barring
capricious bad luck, secure a period of contingency of a century. He
can absolutely guarantee contingency beyond the lives of the
testator's lineals in being (including those unborn) at the testator's
death. And the common law rule remains grandly aloof from the
duration of trusts,1
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so he can provide for a full galaxy of vested

interests for life and in remainder commencing at the end of this
century. Manifestly, the mere existence of such divided ownership
is a substantial obstacle to termination of these trusts. 158 But beyond
154. See p. 64 supra.

155. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 58 (1955). See Morris

and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities 17 (1956).
156. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 55 (1955).
157. Restatement, Property § 378 (1944) ; 1 Scott, Trust § 62.10 (2d ed.
1956).
158. Even if it becomes settled that spendthrift provisions may not be
annexed to such an attenuated plan, the fact that a group of life tenants and
remaindermen must agree to assign their interests (and hence agree on a
division of proceeds) or agree to petition for termination, 3 Scott, Trusts
§ 3337.1 (2d ed. 1956), has an undeniably restraining influence on their
access to the corpus. On the question of spendthrift restrictions, see note 159
infra.
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this it is still unsettled whether spendthrift provisions may be annexed to these vested interests. 5 9 Plainly, in the language of our
national pastime, the umpire is a "homer," allied with the dead
against the living and the unborn.
It is partly for this reason that past objections to wait-and-see
as a liberalization of the common law rule have carried so little
force, though, as we have seen,1 60 a better answer to that complaint is the severability of wait-and-see from the duration of the
perpetuities period. But these two points together afford a powerful
reply to the view that adoption of wait-and-see should be deferred
pending a solution to the problem of limiting measuring lives under
an actual events test more narrowly than at common law. As we
observed earlier in another connection,1 8' the barn is well emptied
under the common law rule, and the adoption of wait-and-see is
no obstacle to correction. But conceding this, our present problem
is, what should be done about the period of the rule?
It is easy enough to reconcile the past with a more restrictive
period of contingency. Wait-and-see advocates have repeatedly
called attention to the perpetuities criterion of Lord Nottingham in
the Duke of Norfolk's case, that of "visible Inconvenience."' 16 2 And
clearly, the perpetuities period which found sanction in that case-a
single, incompetent life in being-involved no prospect of a uniformly available century-long period of contingency. Twenty years
earlier, John Graunt's initial actuarial study of the life expectancy
of Londoners had indicated that not one in one hundred would
live beyond his middle seventies, that thirty-six of one hundred
would die in the first six years of life and that only one in ten would
attain the middle forties. 1 3 Though he concluded that country folk
fared somewhat better, 6 4 and subsequent tables were considerably
159. There seems to be no American case deciding this question. 1 Scott,
Trusts § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956). Professor Simes insists that, if the common
law rule does not apply to indestructible trusts, a closely analogous rule does

limit their duration to the common law perpetuities period. Simes and Smith,
The Law of Future Interests, § 1202 (2d ed. 1956). And the editors of the

American Law of Property regard the period of perpetuities as a probable

maximum. 6 American Law of Property § 24.66 (Leach and Tudor eds. 1952).

But Professor Gray took the opposite view, continued in the fourth edition

of his treatise. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities §§ 432-38 (4th ed. 1942).
And Gray is followed by Dean Griswold. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §§
290-93 (2d ed. 1947).
160. See pp. 65-66 supra.

161. In assessing the common law perpetuities period as a guardian of
the revenue, see p. 52 supra.
162. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 26, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 946, 960 (1682).
163. Graunt, Natural and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills
of Mortality 69-70 (1662).
164. Id. at 76.
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more sanguine, 165 it is clear that a perpetuities period limited to a
seventeenth century life span would be far more restrictive than that
of the present-day common law rule.
True, people live longer today and there is manifest common
sense in gearing the permissible duration of estate plans to life
spans, since most testators are interested in people, not calendars.
But in proceeding from an original conception of one life span, of
expectably brief duration, is there no distinguishable stopping point
short of that presently prevailing at common law-the maximum
number we can keep track of?188

The plain truth is that we have had difficulty in finding one.
Of course, the problem as to contingency is the inclusion of patently
irrelevant lives through savings clauses. But how to limit the
number to relevant lives? The New York solution of a two lives
rule is one possibility,'87 though the obvious difficulty here is that
relevant lives may well exceed that number, a fact which has resulted in some extremely complex New York case law on the subject of separable trusts. 16 The Law Reform Committee has sur-

rendered to the actuaries, advocating an optional period of eighty
years in gross. 8 9
The Committee failed to find a satisfactory method of eliminating their royal lives clauses, declaring, "In this connection we have
considered proposals, based in the main on the undesirability of
'royal lives' clauses, for restricting the permissible lives in being to
those who take some real interest in the property concerned, or have
some real and necessary connection with the limitations. However
desirable such proposals may be in theory, in the end they founder
on the difficulty of evolving a definition which, without being too
complex to be practicable, succeeds in drawing the line in approximately the right place."' 170 True, it may be relevant that the English
tradition favoring freedom of testation is conspicuously stronger
than our own.7 But the fact that this talented Committee, drawn
from the Bar which produced the Law of Property Act of 1925,
165. Thus the Northhampton Experience table of 1780 indicated a life
expectancy at birth of twenty-five years and an expectancy of nearly thirtythree at twenty-one. American Conservation Company, History of Life Insurance in Its Formative Years 377 (1936).
166. Cf. Restatement, Property § 374 (1944).
167. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11.
168. See 6 American Law of Property §§ 25.24-25.28 (Whiteside ed.
1952).
169. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 7 (1956).
170. Id.at 6-7 (1956).
171. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 7-20 (1955).
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confess their inability to solve this technical problem satisfactorily
is most persuasive evidence of its difficulty.
Moreover, there is this disturbing thought. Does it really matter
much that the umpire is a "homer"? Professor Leach is not distressed. Witness his now classic metaphor, depicting the rule as a
nosy oldster whose activities need to be curbed-.1 7 In the context
of a rule whose function is to arbitrate, the metaphor is tantamount
to the proposition that testators can be trusted to be reasonable, so
that succeeding generations require no militant protection. The
Law Reform Committee takes the same position, deprecating the
importance of royal lives clauses on the basis that few testators are
silly enough to go as far as the common law permits.1 73 Of course,
all of this invites the reply that, on such a hypothesis, we do not need
the rule at all. But we need not go so far. We can say, merely, that
the case for restricting freedom of testation in the interest of
succeeding generations is a weak one since few testators, given
free rein, will abuse their license, and add that the rickety old common rule will do for the small task remaining. After all, eventually,
the rule will relax the grip of the departed. And if it seems quite
possible that we will all be Megatoned into oblivion before a few
current estate plans run their course, there is an obvious answer:
let us, in the service of our lineals, concentrate upon these more
pressing problems, and leave the lesser for more tranquil times.
For if we are not to follow the course just suggested, a hard
task lies ahead. It is not an impossible task, but a major reworking
of the law is necessary. As we have seen, the present common law
rule, relatively unconcerned as it is with the permissible duration
of trusts, is a vastly malleable instrument in the hands of a skilled
draftsman serving a determined testator.
Suggestions such as the tentative proposal of Professor Simes
for extension of the rule to require vesting in possession or enjoyment of net income17 4 within the present common law period,
promise limited service to future generations, judging, as we must,
without benefit of a detailed exposition.
On first reading, the proposal would seem to require that any
disposition in trust at the end of the perpetuities period be for the
172. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspectvie: Ending the Rule's Reign of

Terror,65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 725-27 (1952).
173. ... . in any event the mischief of the 'royal lives' clauses, confined
as it is to comparatively few cases, is not in our opinion so great as to call
for a general legislative restriction on lives in being merely in order to rescue
such limitations from what is after all but one aspect of ill-advised drafting."
Law Reform Committee, FourthReport, Cmd. No. 18, at 7 (1956).
174. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 80-82 (1955).
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benefit of a single beneficiary, or in co-tenancy. 175 This seems desirable because the creation of successive vested estates, with their
attendant obstacles to termination of the trust, would be prevented.
But we have assumed that the testator complies with the new rule.
Were he to violate it, and attempt to create vested life estates and
remainders, it would seem that the result would be invalidity of the6
7
remainder interests, which would then vest in the testator's heirs.
And in this latter event, the result would seem to be divided ownership again-the life tenants holding estates vested in possession and
the heirs holding reversions'7 with the result that there are at
least the same obstacles to trust termination during the lives
of the life tenants as with vested interests in remainder, and the
added disadvantage that the testator's plan has been distorted. It
is rather difficult to defend a rule which invalidates the testator's
plan without corresponding benefits in immediate ownership more
prominent than these. Here, there is merely a robbing of remaindermen to pay heirs, and the testator chose the former. 7 8 Of course,
this problem is not necessarily insuperable. For example, it might
be dealt with by vesting invalid interests in income beneficiaries. 1 9
But, beyond the foregoing, it is not apparent that the Simes proposal does anything to insure the invalidity of spendthrift limitations annexed to such terminal vested life estates.
True, Professor Simes' suggestion has other real advantages. It
would reduce the prominence in perpetuities matters of the esoteric
distinction between contingent and vested remainders. 8 0 Prima
facie, assuming that it can be worked out without introducing new
technical problems of a serious nature, such a change would be a
175. Because life estates and vested remainders cannot be created without producing remainder interests which are vested in interest only.
176. Of course, a possible way around this difficulty would be a statutory
rule enlarging the vested life estate into full ownership. But if this is to be the
remedy, why not require vesting in full ownership in the first place?
177. Of course, the heirs may be identical with the life tenants, but if
this is the hoped-for result, why not enlarge the life tenants' estates to begin
with? There is also the possibility that the vested remaindermen will be the
heirs, in which case there will be much ado about nothing if anyone chooses
to raise the perpetuities issue.
178. A possible answer to this whole line of objection would be a cy pres
power in the judiciary to remould an invalid interest. But Professor Simes
has decided against such a solution. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand
78 (1955). And the Qbjection goes further than squeamishness at departures
from the intent of the testator. There is still much force in the words of
Maitland, "Of the law of descent we are therefore obliged to speak, though it is
certainly difficult to criticize it without insulting the intelligence of our
readers. What need be said may be said in few words. The law makes a will
for intestates which no sane testator would make for himself.' 1 Maitland,
Collected Papers 172 (Fisher ed. 1911).
179. This is the Pennsylvania solution. See note 126 supra.
180. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 67-68 (1955).
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helpful simplification of perpetuities doctrine. But the blessings of
this change will be impartial.
Query the oft-repeated admonition tlat we should go slowly
in perpetuities reform and depart but little from the basic structure
of the common law rule.181 Is this not rather near the admonition
that law reform in this area should be confined to steps which will
make it easier for the testator and his counselor to realize the maximum benefits of the liberal common law perpetuities period? Such
is the effect of wait-and-see and of Professor Simes' proposals for
specific statutes to deal with silly possibilities. 8 2
To illustrate more concretely, let us set about the task of outlining a law of perpetuities which seriously considers that succeeding generations have "rights" which the testator is bound to respect,
seeking the sanctions of history insofar as is possible.
One major problem, as we have seen, is the license granted by
the common law rule to create an estate plan which may endure
(through indestructibility or failure of beneficiaries to agree on
termination) for the full life spans of after-born beneficiaries who
take at the close of the permitted period of contingency. And we find,
in Professor Simes' proposal, no clear solution to.this problem. But
he would only require vesting in possession 'or enjoyment of net
income at the end of lives in being and twenty-one years. Suppose
we were to go further and require vesting in possession, free of
trust, at the end of the permitted period? Let us see whether such
a rule can be justified.
Why measure the perpetuities period in lives? The measuring
life sanctioned in the Duke of Norfolk's case 8 3 was a single life in
being which the grantor knew to be incompetent. Let us proceed
from this point. Let us concede that, subject to rights of election, a
testator ought to be permitted to pass conclusive judgment on the
right of his heirs to succeed to his property and, moreover, to
choose the form and extent of their rights if he does elect to benefit
them. Let us concede that this rationale justifies full testatorial prerogative as to the manner and extent of enjoyment and control to be
permitted any person living at his death whom he chooses to benefit,
even his infant grandchildren born subsequent to the execution of
his will, because he might have some basis for concluding that such
an infant would not be competent to manage property, or dispose of
181. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Ride's Reign of
Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 748 (1952); Simes, Public Policy and the

Dead Hand 71-72 (1955).
182. Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 76-78 (1955).
183. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
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it, wisely. Let us go still further and concede that the testator should
be permitted to deny full ownership to persons unborn at his
death, those too young to be expected to have the requisite skill and
judgment to manage property themselves or entrust its management
to competent hands. Let us say that the period of twenty-one years
now permitted is too short for this purpose and that the period
should not be less than thirty years. Does it follow from any of this
that a testator should be permitted to inflict upon the unborn a presumption (and arguendo, a conclusive one) of incompetence after
maturity? Prima fade, no. Prima facie, at this point, we have gone
pretty far in the direction of preserving the prerogatives of donors
and testators.
If the foregoing be accepted, we have a case for stiffening the
common law rule (with a slightly extended period in gross) to the
point of requiring vesting in possession, free of trust and in absolute
ownership, at the expiration of the period of perpetuities. This
means, inevitably, a substantial departure from existing law because we will need several rules applicable to interests which are
vested in possession, those vested only in interest and those which
are contingent. Furthermore, we must endeavor to make these several rules the same, insofar as possible, in the plain interest of simplicity. Now let us see whether such a course is feasible.
Let us commence, with the formulation of a general statutory
rule. Such a rule might say in substance something like this: Whatever the donor or testator says goes until his chosen beneficiary
becomes a person who was not in being at the creation of the interest
and who has attained the age of thirty years. But when the beneficiary becomes such a person he is entitled to be free of the testator's
restraint and influence. He is entitled to whatever property is held
for his benefit, and that of his spouse and lineals, outright. At this
point, he should make decisions affecting his family. He shall take
to the extinction of any interests conferred by the testator on his
spouse or lineals. He shall take absolutely, free of trust, free of the
rights of any subsequent takers who are not in his lineal line, and
free of the rights of any reversioners who might, under the terms
of the instrument, be in a position to claim an interest. He shall
only take subject to the interests of persons in being at the testator's
death who hold prior estates. Now let us take a few examples to
see how such a rule would work.
1. Interests Vested in Possession
Testator devises his residue in trust to pay income to son S
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for life, then to pay income to S's wife W for her life, then in trust
to divide corpus into shares, one for each of the children of S, and,
to pay the income from the several shares to the several children,
respectively, for their lives, corpus to be distributed at the death of
each such child to his then surviving issue per stirpes. At testator's
death, S and W have no children; their single child, A, is born one
year later. S and W both die in a common disaster on A's twentyninth birthday.
Under our proposed rule, the life estates given S and W cannot
be interfered with. And the trust continues for the benefit of A for
one year. On A's thirtieth birthday, under our rule, the trust would
terminate by operation of law and the corpus would vest in A, free
of trust. But query, do we need to go so far in such a case? Do we
need to go further than to give A an absolute right to compel termination, at his election, at or after his thirtieth birthday? Arguendo,
no. Therefore, it might be wise to make this the first modification
of our general rule. In the case of interests which are vested in possession, the right of the beneficiary to take absolutely to the exclusion of subsequent takers shall be elective. Prima facie, if the
beneficiary is satisfied with the testator's arrangement, there is no
reason to disturb it, for our rule exists for his benefit and in such
a case as this there is no reason to force the benefit upon him. And
while the illustration chosen involves a beneficial interest in a trust,
there is no apparent reason why the same rule could not apply to
a succession of legal estates in Blackacre.1 14 In either case, it would
be necessary to work out details regarding the election, but the
problems to be solved in this area are familiar ones- those of
providing notice to interested parties in an orderly manner.
2. Interests Merely Vested in Interest
Here, we may take the same initial facts as in illustration 1.,
but assume that at the testator's death, S's and W's child A was already in being, and that a second child, B, is born one year after
the testator's death. And let us also assume that B attains the age
of thirty while both S and W are still alive. Here, there is even
more reason to have an elective rule. Even though B elects to take
an undivided one-half of corpus to the extinction of the rights of
his issue to participate further in the trust, he cannot secure distribution while S or W remains alive. Prima facie, he may well
decide to defer any such action until they die, and there is no par184. For recent specimens of successive legal estates, see the cases
cited in note 133 supra.
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ticular reason to deny him the privilege. On the other hand, B may
wish to provide for a different disposition of his share of corpus
than that which the testator has planned, and if so the right to make
such a disposition is a valuable right which, prima facie, B is entitled to exercise as an after-born adult. So it would seem appropriate to make our rule an elective one in this context also. Again,
there is no apparent reason to discriminate between legal and equitable interests.
In the trust context, however, a further point is inherent in the
facts. Suppose that B elects to take his undivided one-half, subject
to the rights of S and W, and that A and B survive them. At this
point, the trustee must distribute one-half of the trust corpus to B,
while continuing to hold the balance for A's benefit. It would seem
desirable to give the trustee discretion to distribute in cash or in
kind in order to protect beneficiaries in A's position, subject of
course to the judicial review of his decision which would inhere in
his accounting for a distribution of corpus.
There is still another point of importance inherent in these facts.
The effect of permitting B his election while S is still alive raises
the question of the rights of a child of S born after B so elects. Of
course, in the case of a class gift to children, the event is an unlikely
one because most people do not beget or bear children thirty years
apart. But such a case might arise. One solution would be to close
the class in the event of an election. The alternative would be to
leave the class open to future increase, which would give an afterborn child something at the expense of A, who was in being during
the testator's lifetime and is, perhaps, an even more likely object
of the testator's bounty than B. Faced with this alternative, it seems
easier to justify the former result. To the point that neither result
is justifiable because B's election should not be permitted prior to
distribution day, we have an answer. B is after-born. He is mature
-an
adult. His election does give him something of value -the
right to dispose of one-half of the trust corpus (e.g., by his will)
while his parents are still alive. The testator may not reasonably
deny him this right.
3. Contingent Interests
At this point, we face difficulties with the major premise of our
hypothetical rule. That premise is that it is unreasonable for a testator to deny full ownership to mature persons born subsequent to
his death if he elects to benefit them. But suppose that when such
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a beneficiary appears, it is not clear whether the testator intended
to benefit him?
For example, suppose a bequest in trust to pay income to A for
life, remainder to the children of A who survive A, but if no child
of A so survives, remainder to X. And suppose that all of A's children, B, C and D, are after-born, B attaining thirty during A's lifetime. Now what? Do we invalidate the remainder, pro rata? If so,
in favor of whom? C and D or the testator's heirs? This is a choice
between the unthinkable and the revolting. Cy pres? Possibly, but
this smacks of evasion. How likely is it that available evidence will
really shed light on the testator's intentions in such a case? Arguendo, we must disregard the condition of survivorship altogether
in order to adhere to our purpose, that of freeing adult after-borns
from testatorial restraint. And a case can be made for this solution.
Within such a rule, conditions of survivorship could still operate as
to after-borns who died under thirty, and this would prevent the
passage of an interest through the estate of a minor child; indeed,
very possibly from such a child to a life tenant parent by intestate
succession. Moreover, a thirty year old is in a somewhat improved
position to claim the right to dispose of a remainder interest prior
to distribution. And the objection that a testator was permitted such
a condition at common law cannot be decisive. If our arbiter is to
lose the name of "homer", an ocasional close call must favor the
visitors.
On the other hand, if the contingency is an age contingency, we
might well borrow the Massachusetts solution 8 5 of a statutory rule
reducing the age contingency, under our hypothetical rule, to thirty years.
Of course, there are other sorts of contingencies. For example,
suppose an incentive contingency: a bequest in trust to pay income
to A for life, remainder to the children of A who graduate from the
Yale Medical School. At testator's death, A has no children. Three
children, B, C and D are born subsequently. A then dies and the
trust income reverts to the heirs of the testator. Then B attains the
age of thirty without having so graduated. Now what? To have either a mandatory or an elective rule requiring distribution to B
would utterly defeat the testator's purpose. Yet, though B has not
satisfied the contingency it is possible that he might yet do so. Perhaps it would be well to have a judicial cy pres doctrine to permit a
distribution to B on the basis that the testator would have preferred
such a result. (E.g., suppose B's education was delayed by military
185. See note 59 =upra.

19571

THOUGHTS ON PERPETUITIES REFORM

service and he was a second year student in Yale's Medical School
on his thirtieth birthday.)
If we may generalize from these examples, the application of
our hypothetical rule to contingent interests would seem to require
specific provisions disregarding some, altering others and providing
a judicial cy pres doctrine for the remainder.
4. The Effect of Discretionary Dispositive Powers
Here we may encounter future interests in either income or
corpus, or both, which are either vested subject to defeasance in
the discretion of the trustee, or contingent upon an affirmative exercise of the trustee's discretion. Under the common law rule, such
powers are, of course, invalid if they may be exercised beyond the
permitted period of contingency."' 6 But the trustee's discretion is
not dealt with too harshly if he is restricted to exercising these
powers during the century which is available to him under a seriously drawn savings clause, and directed to dispose of corpus outright or in trust (the chosen beneficiaries to receive vested estates)
immediately before the expiration of the permitted period. Let us
take a case.
Testator bequeaths his residuary estate in trust to pay income
to son S for life, then to S's wife W for her life, and then to distribute income in such shares and proportions as the trustee in his sole
and absolute discretion deems appropriate among the children of S
and W who survive S and W, and, upon the death of any such
child, in the trustee's sole and absolute discretion, to distribute such
share of corpus (if any) as said trustee deems appropriate to such
child's then-surviving issue in such shares and proportions as the
trustee, in his sole and absolute discretion shall deem appropriate, the
trust to terminate nevertheless upon the death of S's surviving child.
Now suppose that S and W have two children, A and B, at the
testator's death and that two more, C afid later D, are subsequently
born. Also suppose that C attains age thirty during the lives of S
and W. And suppose that the trustee, being clearly authorized to
do so by the terms of the testator's will, makes a final determination
on the evening before C's thirtieth birthday that C shall never re186. If the effect of the exercise of the power would be to divest a vested
interest in income or corpus, the result of its invalidity is, of course, to render
that interest indefeasible. But if the interest be contingent upon the exercise

of the power, the consequence of invalidity is to deprive the beneficiary of his
interest altogether. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 246 (4th ed. 1942).
On the application of the common law rule to discretionary powers, see
Gray, Ibid.; 6 American Law of Property § 24.32 (Leach and Tudor ed.
1952).
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ceive any allocation of income. What do we do on the following
morning? One solution, of course, is to over-ride the discretion of
the trustee with a rule to the effect that, whenever a member of a
class in whose favor such a discretionary power over income or
corpus could have been exercised is after-born and attains the age
of thirty, such beneficiary shall be entitled to a pro rata remainder
interest free of trust, to the extinction of any further rights of his
lineal line to participate in the trust and subject only to prior estates
in persons in being. If we are to adhere rigidly to our original
premise, perhaps this should be the result. On the other hand, a
compromise solution is available which will deprive the trustee of
any incentive to exclude such a beneficiary so as to prolong the
trust and at the same time preserve the discretion intended by the
testator to a much greater degree. We could settle for a mandatory
rule, requiring that the trustee exercise his discretion on C's thirtieth birthday to make an irrevocable designation of a pro rata share
of corpus in remainder, i.e., subject to the life estates in S and W
to some person or persons within the eligible class of income beneficiaries. On our facts, this would mean such an allocation of a onefourth remainder interest in corpus among A, B, C and D to the
pro rata extinction, of course, of the rights of any such distributee's
187
lineal line.
5. Executory Interests: Gift Over Prior to Age Thirty
Suppose a testator who wishes to provide for his immediate
family, and then to provide perpetually for the advancement of the
youth of his lineal line. For example, testator bequeaths his residuary estate in trust to pay income to son S for life, then to pay
income to S's only child A for life. Upon the death of A, the trustee
is instructed to distribute income among the issue of A per stirpes
so long as A's lineal line continues, with the proviso that the income
rights of any such issue shall terminate the evening before their
187. One obvious problem which might arise in applying our hypothetical rule to a discretionary trust is not revealed by the illustrative case.
The problem appears in the case of a discretionary power to allocate income
(or corpus, or both) among a class consisting of several generations, e.g.,
the issue of the testator. Suppose such a power in the context of these facts:
At testator's death, his sole heir in his son S who has one child, A. After the
testator's death, children B and C are born to S. When B attains thirty, the
members of the class entitled, in the discretion of the trustee, to receive income
and/or corpus consist of A, A's child X, B, B's two children Y and Z, and C.
Now what is B's pro rata share? One-sixth-because the class now consists
of six eligibles? Or one-half-because B takes to the extinction of future
rights of his lineal line and hence is entitled to three shares of one-sixth
each? Neither solution is appealing, to put it mildly. Pretty clearly, if distribution is to be forced by statute in such a case, B must be alloted onethird. Or in other words, our pro rata distribution must be per stirpes.
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respective thirtieth birthdays. At this point, subject to the variables
of lineal fecundity, we have the prospect of a perpetual private trust
for the advancement of the testator's line. Clearly, we need some
such mandatory rule as that last suggested under illustration 4, a
rule which will in effect prohibit exclusion from the class prior to
age thirty and require a pro rata distribution (subject to any valid
prior estates) on the thirtieth birthday of any such beneficiary.
Here, however, we assume that the trustee has no discretion with
respect to distribution of corpus. This suggests the propriety of a
judicial cy pres rule, authorizing an appropriate court to frame a
decree of partial distribution, subject to valid prior estates and extinguishing, pro rata, the rights of the lineal lines of any such distributees. 188

6. Interests Created by the Exercise of a Power
Suppose that the residuary bequest in illustration 5 was an
appointment by that testator, pursuant to a general testamentary
power given him under his father's will. Here, the only new issue
is whether we define after-borns as persons in being at the creation
or exercise of the power. No departure from the common law rules
seems necessary.
7. Inter Vivos Transfers
Here, again, the new issue is our definition of after-borns. Do
we mean persons in being at the date of the transfer, or persons in
being at some subsequent point in time? Again, no departure from
the common law rules seems necessary.
S. Trusts for a Period in Gross
At the least, the testator is assured of a period in gross of thirty
years. Beyond this, a term trust will be subject to the same rules
as any other trust.
But a broader point is discernible here. We have avoided the
problem of limiting measuring lives to relevant lives by concentration on the rights of the testator's beneficiaries and permitting or
requiring the assertion of those rights, or their termination, when
those beneficiaries become after-borns aged thirty. We do not gear
the testator's rights to any particular period. We tell him instead
that he can do anything he likes for as long as he likes, except to
188. In the case put, the precise question for the court would seem to be
whether the testator's plan would be most effectively carried out by giving
effect to the divesting condition in favor of some other member of the class,
or by refusing to give effect to it.
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tie up property in the hands of after-borns who have reached maturity.
9. In Summary
Of course the foregoing by no means exhausts the problems
which would arise in formulating such a statutory rule. So far, we
have merely sketched outlines. Moreover, nothing has been said of
accumulations or of the application of the rule to charitable trusts,
options, possibilities of reverter, powers of termination or insurance
contracts. But we have a fair outline of the rule's structure as it
might apply to a private estate plan. So what?
I suggest these points. First, prima facie, the technical task of
replacing the stacked deck of the common law perpetuities period
with a rule which comes much closer to a fair arbitration between
today's testators and tomorrow's adults is not impossible, though
substantial departures from existing law would be required. Second,
the task is, nevertheless, formidable enough to require the prolonged
efforts of some able and dedicated technicians, such as those responsible for transforming Helvering v. Clifford,8 9 in sixteen years,
from a muddy Supreme Court opinion into the bulk of Subpart E
of Subchapter J of the 1954 Code, with Regulations, a body of
highly complex doctrine set forth in reasonably workable form. 90
It seems likely that a new rule against perpetuities, tailored with
similar skill, would be workable too. Third, I proffer the foregoing
hypothetical rule as a plausible, or at least provocative, point of
departure for such an effort, assuming sufficient interest in the
project. Fourth, I seriously doubt the sufficiency of that interest,
the recent trends in perpetuities reform having been all the other
way. Moreover, it seems doubtful that this is a transitory situation.
As of any point in time, testators and those presently serving them
can raise a louder clamor in legislaive halls than unborns, and those
who might serve them later. Finally, pending the appearance of such
interest, there is no reason to defer the task of tidying up the present
law. If the umpire is to be a "homer," at least for the time being, it
is better that he be forthright and favor the bench as well as the first
team.
This last returns us to the areas of perpetuities reform in which
there is, demonstrably, current interest-the wait-and-see doctrine.
189. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).

190. See generally Kamin, Surrey and Warren, The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1237, 1259
(1954) ; Craven, Taxation of Estate and Trust Income Under the 1954
Code, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 602, 621 (1955).
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B. WE NEED

A

VAIT-AND-SEE DOCTRINE

As we have observed, wait-and-see is not, at present, a well
crystalized statutory formula. Rather, it is a central idea which has
already been expressed in various ways by its various advocates.1g'
These variations detract from the usefulness of the doctrine, for obvious reasons already stated.19 2 At this point, there is clear need for
a wat-and-see doctrine, available for submission to the legislatures
of the several states. By natural sequence, this leads us to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, whose model statute re-enacting the common law rule has already proved useful, 93 and to the
further suggestion that a model wait-and-see statute be prepared.
Of course, if the Commissioners are to assume responsibility for
promulgating such a statute, their prerogatives in its preparation
must be respected. With all deference, however, it seems appropriate to tender an outline of the subject.
1. How Long Do We Wait?
Pennsylvania, Vermont and the Law Reform Committee are
content to wait throughout the perpetuities period without having
evolved a workable wait-and-see definition of measuring lives. This
is a hard course to justify, even though the issue is effectively postponed. The case for wait-and-see is sufficiently one of technical
convenience to disparage a price in the same coin. Arguendo, a
workable statutory guide can be achieved at the price of an immaterial extension of the common law perpetuities period. 9 4 But pending satisfaction on this point, the Massachusetts solution'95 of a
delayed possibilities test is probably the better choice, though even
that test involves a measuring lives problem deserving of attention.9 8
2. Narrower Problems
There is much to be said for a statute which leaves few stones
unturned. Accordingly, the following deserve serious consideration.
a.
A simple statement that an interest is presumptively valid under-wait-and-see until it fails the actual events test, with the exceptions indicated in b. below.'9 7
191. See p. 62 and notes 84, 85 supra.
192. See p. 63 supra.
193. Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act, 9A U.L.A. 262 (1951).
This statute was enacted in Wyoming in 1949. Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. §

66-138A (Supp. 1955).

194. For a possible statutory provision, see note 96 supra.
195. See p. 64 supra.
196. See p. 64 and note 94 supra.
197. This is the approach of the Law Reform Committee. Law Reform
Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 10-11 (1956).
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b.
Provisions permitting determination of validity at any time if
compliance has become either a certainty or an impossibility."' s
C.

If Pennsylvania rather than Massachusetts style wait-and-see
is to be adopted, a provision recommended by the Law Reform
Committee 9 and approved by Professor Leach 20 0 which carries
the statement in a. above to the logical conclusion that the prospect
of future invalidity does not justify a denial of intermediate income
rights to the holder of a contingent interest.
d.

Though it is better to wait-and-see than to decide on the basis
of possibilities, it makes little sense to wait upon impossible afterborns for lack of evidence. So there is much to recommend the Law
Reform Committee's provisions permitting a determination of fertility in an appropriate case,
and establishing sensible presumptions
20
in the absence of evidence. '

e.
Three other specific provisions seem desirable on the basis that
they make changes in the testator's plans which he would almost
inevitably prefer to invalidity.
(1) One is the familiar provision, reducing an age contingency
202
to twenty-one if necessary in order to avoid invalidity.
(2) The second is a provision for severability of class gifts for
perpetuities purposes, a change recommended by the Law Reform
Committee20 3 and one foreshadowed some years ago by the writings
of Professor Leach. 204
198. The Law Reform Committee suggests the following: If, at the
creation of the interest, it is impossible for it to vest within the permitted
period, the interest is invalid ab initio. Converselly, if an interest is certain, at
its creation, to vest if at all within the period of the rule, it is valid ab initio.
Moreover, at any time during the perpetuities period, any interested person
may apply for a determination of validity or invalidity on the basis of facts
which have occurred since the creation of the interest. Ibid.
199. Id. at 11-13.
200. Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 1411, 1412 (1957).
201. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 9. If the
recommended presumptions (that no woman of 55 or older is capable of
bearing a child and that no male or female under 14 is capable of procreation
or child bearing) are not medically irrefutable as to children, 3 Gray,
Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine 1 301.09 (3d ed. 1951), they are certainly sustainable on the basis that the testator would not contemplate parenthood in persons of such tender years and hence, prima facie, would not intend
to provide for their children.
202. See note 59 supra.
203. Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. No. 18, at 14.
204. Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
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(3) The third is a provision aimed at the unborn widow case,
also recommended by the Law Reform Committee. Their remedy
is a rule of construction interpreting a reference to a spouse which
would produce invalidity as a reference to a spouse in being at the
20 5
creation of the interest thus invalidated.
As to all three of these provisions, the question arises whether
they should apply before or after application of the wait-and-see
dotrine. The Law Reform Committee recommends the former as
to (1)20 6 and (3)207 and the latter as to (2).201 The Committee's
position on (1) provoked vigorous dissents, which seem to have the
better of the argument, 205 and I would quarrel with their conclusion
210
on (3) as well.

I.

Certainly if the Massachusetts version of wait-and-see is to be
accepted, there is much to be said for a specific provision dealing
with the administrative contingency cases, for the typical case of
this sort will not secure the benefits of the Massachusetts wait-andsee doctrine at all. 211 The recent Illinois and Kentucky statutes are
available for guidance in this area, as are the suggestions of Professor Simes.2 1 2 Such a provision is probably unnecessary if the
205. Law Reform Committee, FourthReport, Cmd. No. 18, at 15-16.
206. Id. at 14-15.
207. Id. at 15-16.
208. Id. at 14-15.
209. Id. at 34-35. The position of the dissenters is that there are sensible
reasons for a testator to wish to postpone vesting beyond the age of twentyone and that application of that wait-and-see doctrine to age contingencies
in excess of twenty-one before cutting them down would permit effectuation of
the testator's intention in many of these cases.
210. The Committee, op. cit. supra at 16, takes the position that it is
undesirable to have to wait until near the end of the perpetuities period in
order to determine whether the life estate given an unborn spouse will in fact
bring about invalidity under the rule (i.e., it would not, says the Committee,
if the spouse of the unborn spouse were a life in being and if the latter died
within twenty-one years after the former). I would argue, on the other
hand, that application of wait-and-see before the Committee's remedy would
in many cases give effect to life estates which a testator had provided for the
spouses of his infant grandchildren. And I would argue that it is sound
policy to encourage testators to provide for such spouses, rather than to
obstruct their efforts to do so.
211. See note 62 supra.
212. For the Illinois and Kentucky statutes, see note 60 supra. These
statutes are something less than unassailable in some respects. See Recent Legislation, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1957). Professor Simes' recommendation is
as follows:
There would also be a section providing for the so-called administrative contingency case. In effect it would provide that, where property
is given on the condition precedent 'when my will is probated,' or 'when
my estate is settled,' or 'when my debts are paid,' or a like condition
is stated, and no period of time within which the condition is to happen
is stated, then the will or other instrument shall be deemed to be on the
condition that the will be probated within twenty-one years, or the
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Pennsylvania wait-and-see rule is followed, for these contingencies
are such as will almost always occur in fact within twenty-one years.
Moreover that would seem to be long enough to wait, in such a case.
g.
The utter inability of the testator's heirs to challenge his arrangement under wait-and-see opens the door to their coercion in
the interest of prolonging his plan. 213 Arguendo, the draftsman who
is skilled enough to coerce them is also capable of maximizing the
common law perpetuities period, which should satisfy the most demanding testator. But just in case, it would do no harm to insert a
provision aimed at this possibility.
h.
A good deal has been said of the consequences of invalidity at
common law - a disposition to heirs who may well be the last persons whom the testator intended to benefit. 214 The Pennsylvania

solution, a distribution to persons entitled to income at the end of
the perpetuities statute, 21 5 seems worthy of serious consideration. A

plausible alternative is cy pres, the solution of the new Vermont
statute. 2 8
3. In Summary
While the foregoing outline leaves some areas untouched (e.g.,
the application of the rule to options, possibilities of reverter, powers of termination and insurance settlements), it seems adequate to
estate be settled within twenty-one years, or debts paid within twentyone years.
Simes, The Policy Agaitut Perpetuities,103 U. Pa. L. Rev., 707, 735 (1955).
213. The horror case might be as follows: Testator bequeaths his
estate in trust for son S, his sole heir, for life, with remainders for life
to S's surviving children, followed by remainders for life to great-grandchildren of the testator, followed by a distribution of corpus to the next
generation. Prima facie, in this situation, it is likely that an actual events
test would be violated. Our testator, however, cannily adds one further contingency to the life estates of his grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
Each line of descent will be disinherited in favor of the American Red Cross
unless son S, and each of his children, includes in his or her will a clause
disposing of any interest in the trust corpus which he or she takes by reason
of invalidity under the rule, to the same trustee upon the same trusts as
stated in the testators will.
At this point, a good case can be made for the proposition that, even after
the expiration of lives in being, no one will have anything to gain by
litigating perpetuities questions if the testator's son and grandchildren remain
in line. And it seems quite likely that they will under an actual events test
which denies them access to the courts. The obvious remedy is an express
statutory provision rendering any such contingency invalid as contrary to
public policy.
214. E.g., Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign
of Terror,65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 734 (1952).
215. The Pennsylvania statute is quoted in note 123 supra.
216. Quoted in note 23 supra.
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raise those questions which are of pivotal importance in preparing
a model wait-and-see statute for general adoption. Nor is it suggested that legislative provisions dealing with all of these matters
are indispensible. The point is, rather, that the merits of each should
be considered by the Commissioners.
C. THE RULE AGAINST REMOTENESS OF VESTING
Professor Simes has made the point that the distinction between
contingent and vested interests lacks current relevance and unnecessarily complicates the law of perpetuities. 21 7 His tentative suggestion is an extension of the rule to require vesting in possession
within the permitted period.218 As we have observed this suggestion
does not seem to involve a material stiffening of the common law
rule, though a firm conclusion is impossible in the absence of a
specific statutory proposal. It seems likely, however, that the advantages of this change would be analogous to those of wait-and-see
- simplification of an obtuse area of the law for the benefit of those
who must deal with the rule. As wait-and-see involves only nominal
changes in the rigor of the rule, the same may well be true of this
proposal.
If so, the technical task of reducing the thought to workable
statutory form is one which merits the attention of would-be perpetuities reformers. For if the recent history of perpetuities reform
means anything, the draftsman of such a remedial statute is much
more likely to see his efforts crowned with legislative approval than
the draftsman who dedicates his efforts to substantial abbreviation
of the common law perpetuities period.
III. IN CONCLUSION

Presumably the thesis of this article is, by this time, redundantly
clear. Whatever the innermost thoughts of Lord Nottingham, the
common law rule against perpetuities has, in fact, evolved into a
most generous restraint on testatorial freedom. And judging by the
trend of perpetuities reform, both back to the common law rule and
from it to wait-and-see, there is little current sentiment in the
United States which favors a more rigorous course. This being so,
certain things follow.
One is that such a liberal rule should be a simple rule, both because its restraint is insufficient to atone for intricacy and because
217. See note 180 supra.
218. See pp. 88-89 supra.
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all are equally entitled to its liberality. Thus, we properly conclude
that the possibilities test, though easily evaded and of relatively infrequent offense, is productive of more trouble than it is worth.
Hence we may subsequently conclude that the rule against remoteness of vesting should become a rule against something less esoteric,
if, as seems likely, this can be managed without a seemingly unwanted stiffening of the rule.
Another is that if the rule is truly to become an arbiter, a real
perpetuities revolution will be necessary.
And a third is that, for the time being at least, the unborn should
speak well of their ancestors.
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